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1 Introduction 
This chapter commences with a presentation of the thesis’ motivation and the 
scientific research questions. After this, the analytical approach i.e. the research 
design, theory strategy, explanatory factors and method will be presented. The final 
section outlines the structure of the rest of the thesis.     
1.1 Measuring and Explaining Changes in German Climate 
Policy Strength 2000-2005 
The purpose of this thesis is to measure and explain changes in German climate 
policy strength from 2000 to 2005. Why then study developments in national climate 
policy strength? Surprisingly, there is not much literature on measuring and 
explaining national climate policy strength. From the field of international relations, 
there is an impressive amount of literature on regime effectiveness. Why is not much 
effort made in grasping how a strong national climate policy can be understood?  – 
and in explaining why a national policy is strong or not strong? I find it important to 
make a contribution to this.  
Why study climate policy strength developments in Germany? There are many rea-
sons why this is interesting. First Germany is a large important EU-country. Germany 
was that EU country with the largest emissions in 1990 and the 4 largest emissions 
among the Annex 1 countries to the Kyoto Protocol (Hasselmeier and Wettestad 
2000: 1). Hence, a change in German climate policy strength will send important 
signals to other EU countries. Moreover, Germany has been seen as one of the climate 
front-runners. Looking at emissions data, Germany is indeed the leader among OECD 
countries in reducing emissions of the Kyoto greenhouse gases (GHG )1 by over 18% 
                                              
1
 The Kyoto Protocol covers a basket of six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide N2O), methane (CH4), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfurhexafluoride (SF6). 
 2 
between 1990 and 2000 (Michaelowa 2003: 31). Germany’s climate leadership started 
already during the period 1987–1994 when Töpfer was the minister of the 
environment (Jänicke et al. 2003: 32). Given the long front-runner tradition of 
Germany, it is interesting to detect and explain a potential change in this. 
Furthermore, given that a change has taken place, it is interesting to evaluate which 
factors influence the climate policy strength of large EU countries such as Germany. 
Are changes in German climate policy strength mostly explained by internal 
developments? Are external developments such as changes in EU policy not so 
important for large countries such as Germany? Moreover, if it is so that EU policy 
influences German climate policy strength, through which mechanisms is this 
influence exerted?  
Why study the period 2000-2005? The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 is a milestone in 
international climate policy where developed countries received quantitative 
emissions reduction targets and timetables for the first time (Oberthür and Ott 1999: 
95).  As an EU country, Germany is also under the EU Burden-Sharing Arrangement 
(BSA) of June 1998. This arrangement sub-divides the EU-15 Kyoto target of 8% 
greenhouse gas reduction into differentiated targets for each member state which take 
account of their different national circumstances (ibid.)2. The 2000 national climate 
program3 was the first systematic expression of German climate policy after the EU 
BSA. This program was regarded as ambitious (Schafhausen 2004). However, when 
the next national climate program commenced in 2005, the government was 
confronted with accusations of climate policy slow-down (BMU 2005a: 1). Are these 
accusations supported by empirical facts? 
                                              
2
 The Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol enables countries with reduction commitments to make a bubble (UNFCCC 1997). 
That means they can fulfil their emissions targets jointly by pooling their emissions in a common bubble. The EU has used 
this provision to make an EU-15 bubble and an internal burden-sharing arrangement within this bubble. This will be 
elaborated on in section 2.3.2.  
3
 The climate programs give an overview over German climate targets and policy instrument that are or will be introduced. 
They are to be made each three years by the federal government. However, the 2005 program was delayed by two years.  
 3 
If it has come to a climate policy slow-down, which developments in the period may 
have caused such a change? Many studies4 have shown that a sizeable amount of 
German emissions reductions were due to “wall fall profits”5. Can changing economic 
conditions such as increasing abatement costs explain a potential slow-down? Or 
must political and institutional factors also be taken into account? For instance, the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)6 was introduced in this period. The EU 
ETS Directive7 was agreed upon in June 2003, and adopted in October the same year. 
On January 1, 2005 the worlds first large-scale greenhouse gas emission trading 
scheme was launched covering around 12.000 installations in 25 countries (Pew 
center 2005: 1). This scheme has been called a grand policy experiment8 and was 
introduced to ensure that EU as a whole and each individual EU country could have a 
realistic chance of reaching their targets under the Kyoto protocol and the BSA 
(Butzengeiger and Michaelowa 2004: 117, Wettestad 2005: 17). The period 2005-
2007 of the emissions trading scheme is a pilot phase before the Kyoto period 2008-
2012. Can the introduction of emissions trading have influenced German climate 
policy strength?  
Based on the discussion above it is interesting to investigate two research questions:  
 
                                              
4
 Hasselmeier and Wettestad 2000, Eichhammer et al. (2001), Michaelowa 2003, Mez and Watanabe 2004, to mention 
some.  
5
 After reunification, achieving emission reductions were relatively easy. East German industry was very inefficient and 
competition led to installation shut-downs. Moreover, the marginal costs of energy efficiency abatement were low.  
6
 The ETS will be discussed more in section 3.4 on the 2004 NAP/2005 climate program.  
7
 “The EU ETS Directive” is short for  “Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 
2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending the 
Council directive 96/61/EC” 
8
 see for instance Krüger and Pizer 2004.   
Has there been a change in German climate policy strength from 2000-2005? 
If so, what has caused this change? 
 4 
1.2 Analytical Approach  
This study is a theoretical interpretive single case study9. The objective is to describe 
and interpret changes in German climate policy strength from 2000-2005. In order to 
explain potential developments, explanatory factors10 derived from different theories 
will be used. This study follows a complementary theory strategy (Roness 1997: 91). 
The focus is on what different factors can explain jointly. Hence, a set of explanatory 
factors are chosen which aims to give a comprehensive understanding of the changes 
in German climate policy.  
This thesis makes an analytical distinction between internal (relations in Germany) 
and external factors (factors outside Germany). Four internal factors are regarded as 
important since Germany is a large country. These are: learning from domestic 
climate performance, changes in abatement costs, and changes in power balance 
between Green and Grey forces within the government and between Green and Grey 
societal pressure groups. However, even if Germany is a large country, it is unrealistic 
to assume that German climate policy is determined in complete isolation from its 
environment, such that a number of external factors should be investigated. Two 
external factors are considered to be potentially important: changes in EU 
climate/energy policy and learning from climate performance of other EU countries.   
                                              
9
 This concept is taken from Andersen 1997. The motivation of such studies is to understand the empirical case by using 
generalizations (theory) to shed light on the case chosen (Andersen 1997: 68-69). 
10
 In this thesis “factors”, “explanatory factors” and “independent variables” are used synonymously.    
 5 
The following figure illustrates the explanatory factors studied. 
 
Figure 1-1 Explanatory factors of this study 
The main objective of this study is to understand changes in German climate policy 
strength i.e. empirical changes. However, a theory-interpretive case study may lead to 
theoretical reflections. In the concluding chapter another explanatory model, which 
takes into account the relationship between the factors, will be presented. This model 
is arrived at through induction, and it is suggested that this could be an approach to 
investigating changes in national climate policy strength in a later study. 
In order to answer the research questions interviews and document studies are used. 
Moreover, multiple sources of information are used. This is done because 
investigation of different aspects (different factors, the dependent variable) calls for 
different sources. Moreover, multiple sources of evidence enables cross checking 
information.  
1.3 The Road Map of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis will roughly follow the explanatory model presented above. 
Chapter 2 discusses the analytical framework and the explanatory model will be 
elaborated as the framework unfolds. Moreover, in this chapter the delimitations of 
this study will be discussed. First, the understanding of the dependent variable – 
Internal and External Factors 
National Climate Policy 
Strength  
Internal factors 
1. Learning from domestic climate 
performance 
2. Abatement costs 
3. Power balance in government 
4. Power balance pressure groups 
External factors 
5. Changes in EU climate/energy policy 
6. Learning from EU countries climate 
performance 
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national climate policy strength – is outlined. Then the theory strategy and the 
independent variables are presented. At the end of the chapter, the empirical material 
will be presented and its reliability and validity will be discussed.  
Chapter 3 addresses the first research question: Has there been a change in German 
climate policy strength from 2000 to 2005? Thus, the focus will be on establishing a 
baseline. The 2000 and 2005 climate policy strength will be assessed and the change 
from 2000 to 2005 will be scored. Lastly the scores on the dependent variable will be 
interpreted and it will be made clear which scores that will be explained.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the second research question: What has caused the change in 
German climate policy strength? – that is the scores presented in the last part of the 
third chapter. This chapter maps changes in the explanatory factors and analyses 
whether the factors, both separately and jointly, can shed light on the changes in the 
dependent variable.  
Chapter 5 sums up the discussion and draws some conclusion. Moreover, the 
analytical approach of this study will be assessed. Lastly, a future interesting research 
topic is presented.  
Chapter 6 contains a brief epilogue. The epilogue is included because a quite dramatic 
event took place after the period under investigation: in May 2006 the EU emission 
trading scheme was thrown into chaos. The epilogue seeks to shed some light on this 
event, by using the findings of this study. 
 7 
2  Analytical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to measure and explain changes in German climate policy 
strength. As has been pointed at in the introductory chapter, this study is a theoretical 
interpretative single case study. The main motivation is to understand changes in 
German climate policy strength from 2000–2005 i.e. an empirical interests. However, 
in order to approach this, that is to measure these changes and to explain them, theory 
is used. This chapter presents the analytical approach. 
To explain something three elements are essential. The first element is the dependent 
variable: what is to be explained. The second element are the independent variables: 
what may explain the observed variance/change in the dependent variable. The last 
element is the mechanism: how does the independent variable affect the dependent 
variable. The research questions of this thesis are: Has there been a change in German 
climate policy strength from 2000 to 2005? And if there has been a change, what has 
caused this change? Thus, the dependent variable is national climate policy strength. 
In order to explain changes in national climate policy strength different internal and 
external factors will be investigated. This provides the following explanatory model: 
 
Figure 2-1 Explanatory model 
Assumptions on mechanisms will not be made in this chapter although this does not 
mean that mechanisms are not important. Even if no assumptions are made on this, 
one of the goals of the analysis is to shed light on such mechanisms. In Chapter 4, 
each factor of influence will first be analysed separately, then the interplay of factors 
National Climate Policy 
Strength 
Internal and External 
Factors  
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will be discussed. In the sections on interplay, mechanisms by which the factors have 
influenced the dependent variable will be addressed. 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework. By way of illustration, the model 
above will be elaborated as the framework unfolds. The first section presents an 
understanding of the dependent variable; the second outlines the independent 
variables, the factors. The final section presents the empirical material and discusses 
its quality.  
2.2  How to Measure National Climate Policy Strength  
This section elaborates on the dependent variable – national climate policy strength. 
In the first sub-section, the limitation to federal climate policy output assessment will 
be explained. In the second sub-section an explanation is given of why the strength of 
a national climate policy can be understood as a function of the ambitiousness of 
emission targets and the strength of climate policy instruments. In the third and fourth 
sub-sections the understanding of these two dimensions will be elaborated and the 
dimensions will be further specified. The last sub-section includes a summary and 
mentions assumptions regarding the scores on, and relations between, the dimensions 
of climate policy strength.  
2.2.1 National climate policy strength at the intentional level 
(output) 
In the assessment of policy strength it is important to distinguish between output, 
outcome, and impact. Easton (1965: 351-352) emphasises that a distinction should be 
made between the formal output of decision-making (norms, principles, and rules 
constituting the regime itself), and consequences arising from implementation and 
adaptation of these decisions. In the context of environmental policy this has been 
further specified by drawing a distinction between consequences in the form of 
 9 
change in behaviour, outcome, and consequences for the biophysical environment 
itself, impact (Skjærseth 2000: 64, Underdal 2002: 5-6).  
My point of departure is Underdal’s (1999: 4) definition of policy strength: “a strong 
regime is one whose substantial norms, rules and regulations significantly constrain 
the range of behaviour that qualifies as legal or appropriate”.  Underdal defines 
policy strength with regard to international regimes. An international regime and a 
national policy is not the same11. However, I argue that this characterisation can be 
useful in the analysis of national policy strength. Moreover, this definition focuses on 
the output of decision-making and not the actual effect on behaviour (outcome) or 
consequences for the biophysical environment (impact). Hence, this study will 
investigate whether there has been a change in German federal climate policy 
(output). What kind of output will be assessed? The focus will be on the climate 
programs and the National Allocation Plan (NAP). The climate programs are 
formulated by the federal government, and give an overview over the climate targets 
and climate policy instruments that are, or will be, introduced. The EU ETS directive 
states that each country shall make a national allocation plan. This shall include the 
total amount of emission rights for allocation (the cap), the allocation methodology 
and a list of covered installations (European Commission 2003: Article 9, 10 and 
Annex III).  
Thus, focus will be on output as framed in the climate programs and the NAP, and not 
so much the effect on behaviour or impact on environmental aspects. It can be argued 
that when assessing national policy strength, outcome and impact assessments are 
important. Even if a policy is strong at the intentional level it helps little if it does not 
lead to a change in the behaviour of target groups and (eventually) a change in the 
biophysical environment. However, if assessments of outcome and impact of a policy 
 10 
are to be included, a control for possible sources of influence would have to be made 
while attempting to measure the strength of the national climate policy, and this is 
complicated. With regard to assessing outcome, target groups can change their 
behaviour as a consequence of the changes in national climate policy but also for 
other reasons.  Moreover, a national climate policy consists of many policy 
instruments (over 100 in Germany) and it is very difficult to disentangle the strength 
of different policy instruments in changing the behaviour of targeted groups (to trace 
the behavioural change observed to a particular instrument). Tracing causality 
relations in impact assessments is even more complicated.  
It is argued that assessing impact in addition to output is beyond the scope of a 
master’s thesis. Even so, I could have assessed outcome in addition to output. 
However, there is also an additional reason for not including outcome assessments in 
this thesis: that is that the period under investigation is short, and emissions trading is 
a quite new instrument and the first period of the scheme is a pilot phase. Thus, one 
would not expect that large changes in behaviour have taken place12. In summary, I 
will only focus on assessing the output, national policy strength at the intentional 
level. However, in the assessment of the policy strength of the output, literature which 
judges the outcome/impact of different types of policy instruments will to some extent 
be used.   
National climate policy in this study is understood as the policy of the federal 
government as framed in the climate programs and the national allocation plan. In 
Germany, policy at the federal level is supported by many initiatives at regional and 
local levels. Local governments with responsibilities for city planning, energy policy 
                                                                                                                                           
11
 In the international environmental literature “regime” refers to international regimes. Therefore, the concept “national 
climate regime” will not be used, but rather “national climate policy”. Moreover, a nation state has much more authoritative 
force than an international regime, both in regard to decision-making and on enforcement/sanctions in cases of non-
compliance. 
12
 Studies such as Point Carbon 2006 show that not much internal abatement was made in the first year of the EU ETS 
(2005).  The fact that the instrument was new, that it came fast and following from this, that many had limited 
understanding of the scheme, were some of the reasons mentioned.   
 11 
and transport policy are developing programs to support the federal policy. In 2001, 
over 500 local communities had developed climate programs and many länder, cities 
or communities had also established their own reduction targets (OECD 2001: 199). 
However, for the sake of simplicity it is only the policy of the federal government that 
will be considered as the national climate policy in this thesis.  
2.2.2 Dimensions of national climate policy strength 
The strength of national climate policy will here be understood as a function of two 
elements: 1) ambitiousness of emission targets, and 2) strength of policy instruments. 
The first will be termed the ‘ambitiousness dimension’, the second ‘the policy 
instrument strength dimension’. This can be illustrated as follows:  
 
Figure 2-2 Explanatory model: dimensions of climate policy strength 
The understanding of these two dimensions of climate policy strength will be 
elaborated below.  
2.2.2.1 The climate ambitiousness dimension 
The first dimension of policy strength is the climate ambitiousness dimension. This 
dimension refers to the level of the policy’s emission reduction targets13. In the 
assessment of the climate ambitiousness of the climate programs/NAP the focus will 
be on the amount of CO2 and other Kyoto greenhouse gases they declare that they will 
reduce. This is because (ceteris paribus) a policy aiming at a 40% emission cut 
                                              
13
 It can be argued that this is the real test of environmental policy. It is of course linked to the seriousness of the 
environmental problem in question. If the problem is not very serious, low ambitiousness should come as no surprise. 
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constrains behaviour more than a policy aiming at for instance 25 per cent reduction. 
Moreover, the focus will be on the estimated amount of CO2 reductions for the 
economy as a whole and for each sector of the economy. Furthermore, the amount of 
greenhouse gases the main instrument in the policy combination is to reduce will be 
commented. A short implementation time can, to some extent, be an indication of 
ambitiousness14. In this thesis, the time dimension will be integrated in the climate 
ambitiousness dimension. In assessing the ambitiousness of estimated emission 
reductions, an investigation will be made of how much the program/plan aims at 
reducing per year (dividing the amount of reduction that is to be managed in the time 
period on the years)15.  
2.2.2.2 The policy instrument strength dimension 
The second dimension of policy strength is the policy instrument strength dimension. 
For the sake of simplicity, in the evaluation of this dimension the focus will be on 
assessing the main instrument in the climate policy instrument mix: the Voluntary 
agreements (VAs) in 2000 and the emissions trading scheme in 2005. The overall 
climate policy instrument mix will also be assessed albeit to a limited extent. As 
mentioned above it is output that will be assessed. However, in the output assessment, 
I will use previous studies that assess outcome/impact of similar instruments.  
To measure policy instrument strength I will commence with Vedung’s principle for 
policy instrument classification, degree of authoritative force. By degree of 
authoritative force Vedung means the degree of power which the government is 
prepared to use in order to achieve compliance16.  Based on this he distinguishes 
                                              
14Some might also argue the opposite; see for instance March et al. 1958. Short implementation time can also signal that 
one has to do with symbolic policy, assuming that if they really wanted to do something with the problem they would have 
a more realistic approach to it.  
15
 Instead of estimated emission reductions per year, one could also use the distinction short-term targets vs. long-term 
targets. However, this is not done here. 
16
 In principle instruments have two constituent parts: a certain action content, telling the target population what to do or 
how to behave, and a certain authoritative force, that is, they state the degree of power which the government is prepared to 
use to achieve compliance (Vedung 1998: 34).  
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between regulations (the stick), economic means (the carrot) and information (the 
sermon), arguing that regulations are more constraining than economic means, and 
economic means are more constraining than information (ibid.: 34)17.  See Vedung’s 
classification in the figure below. The left side of the figure symbolizes a high degree 
of authoritative force.  
 
Figure 2-3 Vedung’s classification of policy instrument 
In international relations theory bindingness, specificity, scope and compliance 
mechanisms are viewed as important criteria in the assessment of the strength of 
international agreements. Even though international agreements (regimes) and 
national policy are not the same, I will argue that these dimensions can be seen as a 
further specification of Vedung’s concept degree of authoritative force. Thus, the 
policy instrument strength dimension will be understood here as a dimension focusing 
on how strong the main policy instrument (and to some extent the overall policy mix) 
are formally in terms of bindingness, specificity, compliance mechanisms and scope. 
Arguing that positive score on these dimensions indicates strong climate policy 
instrument(s)18.  
‘Bindingness’ will here be understood as whether the commitments are binding within 
the framework of national law. By moving from declarations of intent to legally 
binding instruments the behaviour that qualifies as legal is constrained and policy 
strength increased (Wettestad 2002: 10). For instance, the policy instrument 
information is not a binding, while command and control instruments are binding.  
                                              
17
 It can be argued that regulations and economic means can both function as carrots and sticks. Regulations can also be 
enabling and economic instruments can sometimes be perceived as more constraining than regulations, for instance when 
comparing a very high tax to a not very “scary” regulation. However, it can be argued that even in this case the tax is less 
constraining because the regulation forbids something (Vedung 1998). 
 
Policy instruments 
Regulations Economic means Information 
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Specificity refers to the level of detail regarding the character of the policy’s targets. 
Moving from general ambitions to reduce emissions sometime in the future, to more 
specific quantified and time-bound regulations constrains the range of behaviour that 
qualifies as legal or appropriate, and leads to an increase in policy strength (Ibid.). 
High level of detail means more transparency up to a certain level of detail; if 
specificity becomes really high then it may become complex and transparency may 
decrease. If there are quantified targets and timetables and the system is transparent, 
the implementation will be more meaningful and easier for all parties involved to 
monitor. Transparency will make the instrument sensitive to governmental and public 
pressure and hence potentially stronger (Skjærseth 2000: 67). Since the climate 
programs consist of over 100 policy instruments19, an assessment of specificity of all 
instruments will be too complicated; therefore, only the specificity of the VAs and the 
ETS will be assessed. 
Scope refers to the policy instruments (policy instrument mix’s) range with regard to 
greenhouse gases. It can be argued that a policy with broad scope, covering all sectors 
and all types of emissions, is stronger than a policy only covering some of the sectors 
or some of the greenhouse gases. However, emission trends of different greenhouse 
gases and for different sector will have to be taken into account in the assessment of 
ambitiousness of the scope.  
Concerning compliance mechanisms, the focus will be on the policy’s monitoring 
regime and the sanctions in the case of non-compliance. Moving from a policy less 
easily monitored and with no sanctions in case of non-compliance to a policy with a 
well-established monitoring regime and with explicit and strong sanctions leads to an 
increase in policy strength.   
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 This is in itself a factor that reduces the transparency of the climate policy. Even if climate policy involves many sectors, 
this are very many of measures, and this will contribute to poor transparency.  
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2.2.3 Possible dimensions of climate policy strength 
It might be argued that legitimacy, the government’s capacity to put through its 
policy, and cost efficiency also have to be taken into account when assessing the 
strength of national climate policy. These elements will be discussed below.  
Legitimacy of a policy understood as support from involved actors (not only target 
groups) who perceive the policy as coinciding with their own views, feelings or 
objectives, can be argued to be an important criterion (Bemelmans-Videc 1998: 8)20. 
There are many studies showing that if the policy is not legitimate it will be 
problematic to get it accepted in government but also (if accepted in government) 
there can be problems later on with the implementation of the policy21. But, what is 
the relationship between legitimacy and the dimensions of policy strength? Is 
legitimacy a dimension of policy strength? Even if a policy has ambitious targets and 
strong policy instruments if it is not considered as legitimate by involved actors it can 
be questioned how strong the policy (really) is. However, since this study is limited to 
output assessment, it can be argued that this comment superfluous. Thus, legitimacy 
will not be seen as a dimension of national policy strength. Bemelmans-Videc (1998: 
8) argues that legitimacy can be viewed as a condition sine qua non for policy 
instrument strength, without it, the governed part will look for behaviour alternative 
to the one prescribed or induced by governments, and thus frustrate the intended 
effects (ibid.). I maintain that in addition, legitimacy can be viewed as a precondition 
also for climate ambitiousness (targets)22. Thus, legitimacy will be viewed as a 
precondition, as an independent variable external to policy strength.  In explaining the 
                                              
20
 Legitimacy has various meanings. It might refer to the extent to which the government’s choices are perceived as just and 
lawful in the yeas of the involved actors, subjective lawfulness – to be distinguished from legality, objective lawfulness. Or 
legitimacy might have a broader meaning (Bemelmans-Videc 1998: 8). It is this broader meaning of the concept to which I 
refer.  
21
 See, for instance, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 458). 
22
 Political acceptance is not a necessary condition for choosing that policy: sometimes policies are chosen that are not 
legitimate. One example is the Norwegian CO2 tax; this was decided without the acceptance of the target groups. Moreover, 
if for instance a tax is not accepted by the target groups but generally accepted by the public then it can live for some time. 
 16 
changes in policy strength among other things the political acceptance will be 
assessed23. 
If a national policy with ambitious emission targets, strong policy instruments and a 
national government that is considered as weak is compared to a national policy with 
less ambitious targets and less strong policy instruments and the government is 
considered as strong, it is not necessarily so that the overall policy strength of the 
former is higher. Hence, the capacity of the national government, if it is considered as 
strong or weak actor concerning the follow-up of its policy, can be argued to be 
important in relation to policy strength. However, since this is an output study, it can 
be claimed that this argument is also superfluous. Thus, this will not be viewed as a 
dimension of policy strength but as a possible explanation for changes in policy 
strength.  It may be that the decision-makers, knowing that they have become weaker, 
(and that they therefore will have problems putting through a policy with ambitious 
targets and/or strong policy instruments), reduce targets and instrument strength in the 
climate program.  
It can be argued that cost efficiency is an important criterion with regard to policy 
instrument choice: if the policy is not economically sound it will often not be chosen. 
One important aspect of cost efficiency is dynamic efficiency. Dynamic efficiency can 
be understood as the extent to which policy tools simulate long-term technological 
innovation (Skjærseth 2000: 64). Can it be argued that for a climate policy to be 
strong it has to be cost effective? I will suggest not, because this study is concerned 
with environmental aspects in relation to policy strength (the intentions with regard to 
solving the climate problem in the climate programs/plans). As with the case of the 
legitimacy and strength of the national government, cost efficiency assessments will 
                                              
23
 Legitimacy is often inversely related to the policy strength dimensions. Strong instruments/ambitious targets are often 
viewed as illegitimate. If the government decides to include target groups then it might end up with weaker instrument 
and/or less ambitious targets. However, if the government decides to not include these groups, implementation problems 
can be the result.  
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to some extent be discussed as possible explanations for the climate policy strength 
changes24.  
2.2.4 Summing up on national climate policy strength 
Measuring national climate policy strength has been discussed in this chapter. A 
limitation to output and federal policy output has been made. Moreover, strength of 
national policy has been presented as a function of climate ambitiousness and policy 
instrument strength. Target group acceptance, political capacity to follow up and 
economic considerations have been discussed as potential dimensions of policy 
strength. However, given my focus on output these are seen as factors potentially 
important for explaining national policy strength, i.e. as independent variables. 
Furthermore, climate ambitiousness is specified as the overall climate target and 
sectoral targets. Policy instrument strength is specified as specificity, bindingness, 
scope and compliance mechanisms. This gives the following explanatory model: 
 
Figure 2-4 Explanatory model: elaboration on the dependent variable 
Some expectations with regard to the relationship between the two dimensions are 
that intuitively one might expect that they are connected and that the scores on the 
dimensions match each other, for instance, that a high score on one dimension goes 
together with high scores on the other. This is because (certeris paribus) if one has 
ambitious targets strong instruments will be needed to reach them. Of course, this is a 
                                              
24For instance, the cost efficiency of a policy instrument can explain why it is preferred/accepted or not in the government 
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simplification25, but it is a starting point and the later analysis will seek to answer this. 
If the dimensions are connected which way does the causality work? If there has been 
a change along the dimensions, which dimension caused some of the change in the 
other? It is possible to think that they are connected in several different ways and the 
later analysis can shed light on this.  
2.3 Explaining Changes in National Climate Policy Strength 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In this section the theoretical approach will be presented by answering the question 
which factors can shed light on the developments in national climate policy strength? 
However, first the theoretical strategy of this study will be outlined. In the discussion 
on explanatory factors, the left side of the explanatory model will be elaborated as the 
framework unfolds.  
2.3.2 Theoretical strategy and different types of explanatory 
factors 
As was mentioned in the introduction, this thesis follows a complementary theoretical 
strategy. In studies using this theoretical strategy, the focus is on what may be 
explained by the different factors; if they jointly provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the case26. This is in opposition to the strategy where theories are 
seen as competitive, and the focus is on choosing between theories (Roness 1997: 
103). The success of studies using a theory complementary strategy is dependent on 
                                                                                                                                           
and among target groups.  
25
 It can be argued that aspiring targets (targets which is not implemented) may function as an instrument and stimulate to 
stronger climate policy in the future (Interview).  
26
 Behind this statement lies an assumption usual in positivist theory: there is an objective physical reality independent of 
our perception of it. Thus, each perspective can be viewed as making a contribution to the understanding (uncovering) of 
the same phenomenon. Hence, it is assumed possible with the right theoretical toolkit to uncover what happened and how 
(Hatch 2001: 22-23).  
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the extent to which the factors chosen are valid jointly (ibid.: 102). Given this, the 
question can be asked: how may changes in national climate policy strength best be 
understood?  
In this study it has been important to choose explanatory factors that enabled the best 
possible understanding of such changes. Underdal has three models for explaining 
compliance and defection (Underdal 1998).  Underdal’s objective and perspective is 
geared towards explaining compliance. This thesis has a different objective; 
explaining national policy strength. Hence, it can be argued that to use Underdal’s 
models uncritically for this purpose would not have been a particularly valid 
approach. In my view, elements from these models are more general and can be used 
to explain why changes in national policy occur27. Hence, the selection of explanatory 
variables is inspired by elements in Underdal’s three models. However, the selection 
is also inspired by other theory and the combination of factors is guided by the wish 
for an approach good at grasping changes in national climate policy strength.  
It can be argued that the approach used in this thesis increases validity. This is 
because empirics systematised through explanatory factors selected because they were 
thought as suitable will be more relevant in the answering the research question. 
Thus, this will strengthen the validity of the overall conclusion. However, even if a 
valid explanatory framework is the goal, concerns for simplicity and feasibility, have 
to be taken into account. Hence, this places some restrictions on number of 
explanatory factors.  
This thesis undertakes an analytical distinction between internal factors and external 
factors.  First, one would expect internal factors to be especially important in 
explaining the changes in German climate policy. This is because Germany is one of 
                                              
27
 Two of Underdals model are based on interest based theories, the last one is based on preference change theories.  I will 
argue that intuitively, a change in climate policy strength can either be due to changing power balance between the actors 
(their preferences stay the same) or that actors change their views (change preferences). Hence, in the selection of 
explanatory factors I will chose factors from both types of theories. 
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the largest EU countries and in 1990 was that EU country that emitted the most CO2, 
and the fifth largest emitter at the global level after the US, China, Russia and Japan 
(Hasselmeier and Wettestad 2000: 1). Moreover, in the 1990s and at the beginning of 
2000s Germany was one of the standard-setting countries for environmental policy in 
the EU (Andersen and Liefferink 1997: 26). Furthermore, The EU has been a key 
actor in international efforts to build an effective response to the global climate 
change challenge (Wettestad 2001: 139).  
Even though Germany is a large country and has been one of the standard setting ones 
it is still unrealistic to assume that German climate policy is decided in complete 
isolation from its environment. Therefore, I will also focus on external factors and see 
to what extend changes in these external factors can contribute to shed light upon 
changes in German climate policy strength. There are two important elements outside 
Germany that can have influenced on German climate policy: the EU level (EU 
climate policy) and the international climate regime. 
 
As have been pointed out by the literature on Europeanisation, it has become 
increasingly important to take developments at the EU level into account when 
discussing and understanding the development of national policies in EU countries28. 
It has been argued that the international level is easily neglected; impacts from this 
level should also be taken into account when explaining changes in national policy. In 
most areas of transnational environmental problems, there is a core environmental 
regime interacting with the EU environmental policy (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2002: 
101). In the climate field, the EU and Germany participate in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In this study, however, the 
international level will not be focused on. There are two reasons for this.  
                                              
28
 Some might disagree with this. In Moravcisk’s liberal intergovernmentalism, states are a priori in control of integration 
(Jordan 2002: 45). Moreover, the only way a state can experience an EU level outcome that it does not want is if the state is 
outnumbered in the EU level process. The EU level (in itself) have no independent effect on national policy (ibid.: 50).  
 21 
Firstly, the association of EU policy and the international regime makes it difficult to 
disentangle the effect of the international regime on German climate policy. One 
example of illustrating how the EU climate policy and the international climate 
regime are interconnected is the EU burden-sharing arrangement. A first brief 
discussion on a target-sharing arrangement took place in the EU before the 1992 
Conference of the Parties (COP). However the process did not arise again before the 
1995 COP and the Berlin Mandate adaptation when the EU countries realised that 
they had to develop a formal burden-sharing arrangement to gain acceptance for a 
common EU commitment and to exercise leadership (Wettestad 2001). After Kyoto, 
the BSA was adjusted and in 2000 made legally binding, independent of the Kyoto 
agreement ratification (Council 2000: 5). Thus, the making of the BSA cannot be 
understood independently of the international level although the timing of the entry 
into force was not connected to the international level.  
Secondly, Mez and Watanabe (2004: 124) argue that the Kyoto Protocol did not have 
a direct impact on Germany’s climate policies, but it did have a wide range of indirect 
impacts: Kyoto has led to changes in EU climate policy29.  
Below, the factors taken from theory and propositions behind each factor will be 
presented. There are some indications that a slow-down in German climate policy 
occurred during this period. In the formulation of propositions a simple point of 
departure will be that the changes along both dimensions go in the same direction, i.e. 
towards decreasing climate ambitiousness and decreasing policy instrument strength. 
Moreover, in the propositions only one of the indicators (of change) in the factor will 
be included.   
                                              
29
 This can be shown by the emissions trading case. The US introduced the concept into international negotiations and the 
Kyoto protocol. EU was more skeptical, and favored command and control policies (Oberthür and Tänzler 2002: 321). 
Despite EUs original skepticism the concept gained support within the EU, the Kyoto protocol was decisive in this (ibid.: 
323).  
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2.3.3 Potentially important internal changes 
Here, four internal factors will be presented. The first factor is learning from domestic 
climate performance. The second factor to be assessed is the influence of changes in 
abatement costs on German climate policy. The next factor is the power relationship 
between Green and Grey forces within the national government. The fourth factor is 
the power relationship between Green and Grey societal pressure groups.  
2.3.3.1 Preference change due to learning from domestic experience 
with emission reductions 
Can it be that decision-makers learning from prior experience with national climate 
policy may have contributed to changes in climate policy strength? This means that 
the decision-maker’s preferences with regard to ambitious emission targets and strong 
policy instruments may have changed between 2000 and 2005. Decision-makers are 
assumed to enter the policy process with imperfect information and tentative 
preferences. Accordingly, they seek information and try to persuade others. Policy 
largely develops through learning and is maintained through ‘rutinisation’ (Underdal 
1998: 21). Decision-makers can learn as a consequence of domestic experience (own 
experience). Moreover, there can also be learning between the Member States. 
Learning can take the form of sophisticated adaptation of ideas related to the 
particular problem at hand, or the simpler form of copying ideas or solutions. 
Learning can also be strictly instrumental (choice of means only) or include policy 
goals and norms as well (ibid.: 21).  
How can German decision-maker’s learning explain the changes in climate policy 
strength? It might be that the success of previous German climate policy led to a 
preference change among the decision-makers: that there was no longer a need for an 
ambitious climate policy. How can I conclude that there has been such a preference 
change? First an investigation of whether CO2 and the other GHG emissions have 
decreased in the period will be made. Then, the question of whether changes here 
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have lead to the learning process described above will be addressed. Thus, it is expect 
that:  
P1: Learning from domestic experience may have taken place. German decision-
makers may have learned that large reductions have been made, thus there was no 
need for ambitious climate policy (preference change). This learning and preference 
change may contribute to explain decreasing German climate policy strength. 
2.3.3.2 Abatement costs 
Could it be that changing costs of climate policy can have contributed to the changes 
in climate policy strength as have been pointed out by Underdal (1998)? It is assumed 
that decision-makers evaluate options in terms of costs and benefits to their nation. 
Moreover, that they choose whichever option they believe will maximise net national 
gain (Underdal 1998: 3).  Furthermore, if the national marginal abatement costs 
exceed the marginal damage costs then the decision-makers will not choose that 
option, or change from that option to another (ibid.). However, in regard to climate 
calculations, many countries do not take damage costs into account when calculating 
the cost and benefit of an option. This is mainly a result of the high uncertainty 
connected to predication (Bang 2003: 21). Therefore, the inquiry of this study will be 
limited to abatement costs.  
The abatement costs of implementing the 2000 climate program will be assessed. A 
comparison of reference scenario with projections will be used as an indicator of this. 
It can be argued that the impact of costs from abatement will largely depend on how 
the costs are concentrated. There are two important elements here: Are emissions 
concentrated in a sector with a high energy efficiency and fuel switch potential? How 
important is this sector for the national economy? The question whether abatement 
costs have increased in the period will then be discussed. Since the largest amount of 
CO2 emissions in Germany stem from the energy sector, the potential costs for 
mitigation in Germany will be largely related to energy efficiency measures, 
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restructuring of the energy sector and energy conservation. The question of energy 
efficiency will be investigated – and whether the fuel switch potential has decreased 
in the period. For feasibility reasons energy conservation will not be investigated. 
Moreover, the ETS and VAs will be compared with regard to national abatement 
costs. Moreover, it can be argued that for the decision-makers calculating costs from 
abatement, the general economic situation and unemployment situation are also 
relevant. The argument is that a strong economy can bear more costs than a weak 
economy. Hence, I will investigate how the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures 
and unemployment have developed in the period under investigation.   
It can be argued that abatements may also lead to positive side-effects such as 
innovation (Underdal 1998: 8). However, for feasibility reasons this is not examined 
in this thesis.  
The following is expected concerning abatement costs: 
P2: Changes in decision-makers’ assessment of abatement costs may have taken 
place, for instance may decreasing energy efficiency potential increase abatement 
costs. These changes may contribute to explain decreasing German climate policy 
strength.  
2.3.3.3 Power relationship between Green and Grey forces in 
government 
Since the policy chosen must also be politically feasible within the government it is 
important to investigate whether changes have occurred in the power balance within 
the government. Governments can be viewed as multifaceted organisations over 
which no single decision-maker has full control. Decision-makers assess options in 
terms of costs and benefits; however, their utility function can be different. The 
perspectives and interests of decision-makers are to some extent shaped by their 
positions (Allison 1971: 176, Underdal 1998: 13). Can it be that the changes in 
national climate policy can be explained by changes in power balance between Green 
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and Grey forces in government? Green forces are defined as those who work for a 
strong climate policy; Grey forces are those who do not want a strong climate policy. 
Green and Grey are relative concepts and are not dichotomous; some are viewed as 
“greener” than others. The concept of forces in this thesis refers to two groups – 
ministries and political parties.  
The party factor can also be viewed as important; some parties are viewed as 
“greener” than others. Thus, the parties that are in government and their power 
relationship are important. Changes in election results will be used as an indicator of 
changes in power balance between governing parties. In the period under 
investigation, there was a federal election in 2002 in Germany. A decrease in climate 
policy strength can be due to weakening of green political parties in this election.  
The climate policy issue is a cross-sector issue where many ministries have a say, 
such as the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Economics and Labour, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Buildings and Transport, to mention the most 
important. Thus, one would expect conflicts and different interests and opinions. 
However, since VAs and emissions trading affects the energy and industry sector and 
that the Ministry of Economics and Labour is responsible for measures in this sector 
in Germany, the focus will be on the power relationship between the Ministry of 
Environment (BMU) and the Ministry of Economics and Labour (BMWA). How can 
a change in the power relationship between these two ministries be measured? Some 
indicators taken from organizational theory will be used. These are whether there 
have been changes in the BMUs capacities and its ability to intervene in the other 
ministry’s domain. Further, whether changes have occurred in the BMU and BMWA 
ministers’ political clout, also whether there has been an increase in the 
budget/number of employees (also related to changes in the tasks of the ministries). 
Hence, arguing that a potential decrease in climate policy strength might be due to a 
relative weakening of the BMU, i.e. a relatively weaker possibility to intervene in the 
other ministers’ domain, relatively weaker political clout of the BMU minister, 
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relatively weakening of the budget/number of employees related to tasks. Thus, the 
relevance of the following assumption will be discussed: 
P3: The Green forces in government may have been relatively weakened, for instance 
may the Green forces in government have been weakened due to weak election 
results. These changes may contribute to explain decreasing German climate policy 
strength. 
2.3.3.4 Power relationship Green and Grey societal pressure groups 
In liberal societies the policy chosen should also be politically acceptable to society.  
It can then be argued that it is important to investigate the power relationship between 
Green and Grey societal pressure groups. This builds on a bottom up view of politics, 
as for instance, found in liberal theory. Representative institutions are seen as a 
critical transmission belt by which the preferences and social power of individuals 
and groups are translated into state policy. Thus, the state policy is constrained by the 
underlying identities, interests and power of individuals and groups who constantly 
pressure the central decision-makers to pursue policies consistent with their 
preferences (Moravcsik 1997: 518).   
It has been argued that the distribution of the costs and benefits of a policy in society 
is important for the acceptance (and thus the success of the policy). If the costs are 
concentrated on some specific sectors of the economy or an organised segment of 
society and the benefits are widely dispersed throughout the society, it will most likely 
be politically problematic (Wilson 1973: 332, Underdal 1998: 14). This is especially 
so when the sectors concerned also belong to the social centre in the society. Then 
these targeted sectors will mobilise (Underdal 1998: 16). Moreover, it has been 
argued that the conflict will tend to increase when, in addition to an asymmetrical 
distribution of cost and benefit, the problem activity in question stems from point 
sources that are easy to identify and very visible. In such situations Environmental 
Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs) are also mobilised as a counter-balancing 
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force to the target groups (Skjærseth and Wettestad. 2002: 111). I will investigate 
whether the change from VAs to ETS made the costs clearer and more concentrated, 
thus leading to a mobilisation.  
Thus, an investigation will be made as to whether the Green forces have become 
relatively weakened. Green forces here means ENGOs and industry that profit from 
climate policy such as renewable energy companies; Grey forces will mean target 
groups, conventional industry. This is of course a gross simplification. There are 
shades of grey and green. For instance there are branches of conventional industry 
that are greener than others. How am I to measure if the Green forces have become 
relatively weakened? It was argued in 2000 that conventional industry is stronger in 
Germany because it is more concentrated than the green forces, and the federal 
decision making process is centralised. Moreover, it has been argued that 
conventional industry has had better contacts, formally and informally (Böckem 2000: 
9). Hence, two indicators will be used in the assessment of whether Green pressure 
groups have become relatively weakened: the degree of concentration/organization 
and the formal and informal contact patterns. The following preposition will be 
considered: 
P4: Green societal pressure groups may have been relatively weakened. For instance 
may Grey pressure groups concentrations have increased strengthening their lobby 
power.  These changes may contribute to explain decreasing German climate policy 
strength. 
The internal factors have now been presented and are summed up in the figure below 
 
Figure 2-5 Explanatory model: elaboration on the internal factors 
Internal and External Factors 
National Climate Policy 
Strength  
Internal factors 
1. Learning from domestic climate 
performance 
2. Abatement costs 
3. Power balance in government 
4. Power balance pressure groups 
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2.3.4 Potential external changes 
2.3.4.1 Changes in EU climate and energy policy 
At its founding, the EEC was primarily an intergovernmental agreement between 6 
states and had no formal environmental policy and no environmental bureaucracy. 
Today, the EU has some of the most progressive environmental policies of any body 
in the world though it is not a state. In the EU, national environmental policies are no 
longer legally or politically separate from EU environmental policy, they have been 
deeply Europeanised30 (Jordan 2003: 19).  The Europeanisation perspectives focus on 
assessing how and to what extent European integration has had national political 
consequences (Kallestrup 2005: 22). I am interested in the potential impact of EU 
policy on German climate policy: can changes in EU climate/energy policy explain 
changes in German climate policy strength?  
EU level changes can impact on national policies, polities and politics. The dependent 
variable of this study is changes in German climate policy strength as it is framed in 
the climate programs. Thus, I am interested in how EU level changes have impacted 
on national climate policies.  
The EU policy can impact on domestic policy through new regulations, directives and 
decisions (Jordan 2002: 22). For instance, member states will have to transpose EU 
directives into their national legislation. In October 2003 an EU directive establishing 
an emissions trading system in the EU was adopted. The manner in which climate 
ambitiousness was described here will be investigated, for instance if the directive 
contained country specific caps. Moreover, whether a new EU burden-sharing 
arrangement was adopted will also be investigated.  
                                              
30
 The concept Europeanisation has different meanings. Here the concept means “the impact of Europe on the domestic 
structure”. However, the concept can also mean “European institution building” (Eliassen and Andersen 2001: 12-13). 
Europeanization also has a third meaning “the spread of European ideas and mentalities outside Europe’s borders”.  
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It can also be argued that the EU level may have influenced German climate policies 
by influencing domestic polities or politics. When assessing the factors together 
changes at EU level will be examined to see whether these have led to changes in 
policies as a consequence of impacting on domestic politics. The indirect effects of 
two EU policy developments will be investigated: the introduction of the EU 
emissions trading directive, and hence the change of main instrument for VAs to ETS, 
and the liberalisation of the power market. The introduction of the ETS may have 
meant a change in climate policy instrument strength, and this may have influenced 
domestic politics by influencing target groups mobilisation31. Moreover, in July 
199632 it was agreed at the EU level to liberalise the power sector within the 
framework of an internal energy market (Wettestad 2005: 9). Whether this EU lead 
liberalisation of the power market has affected German climate policy strength 
indirectly by impacting on the competition (and hence concentration) of German 
power generators will also be discussed. 
EU influence on policies through influencing polities could also be interesting; 
however for simplicity, this will not be investigated in this thesis. The relevance of 
the following proposition will be investigated: 
 P5: Changes in EU climate/energy policy may have taken place. For instance may 
the EU ETS directive have established high caps for Member States. These changes 
may contribute to explain decreasing German climate policy strength.  
2.3.4.2 Learning from other EU-15 countries climate performance  
It is important to assess cognitive aspects and interest change at the EU level also. 
Germany can learn from what other EU countries do with regard to climate policy. It 
has been argued that transnational learning is most likely to occur between actors 
                                              
31
 This assessment of whether a change in policy instrument strength has impacted the German climate ambitiousness will 
address one possibility of how the two dimensions of policy strength are related.  
32
 The electricity directive was adopted December 1996. Each country had to transpose the directive by February 1999.  
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which are ideologically or culturally close (Underdal 1998: 21). One would expect the 
countries, especially given the EU burden-sharing arrangement, to look at each 
other’s Kyoto gaps (distance to Kyoto target) and take this into account when 
choosing what to do. The potentially decreased climate policy strength might thus be 
explained by Germany learning that other countries do little with regard to climate 
policy.  
How will this be investigated? First, the GHG emission reduction levels will be 
discussed and whether these showed that EU-15 countries were far from achieving 
their targets and/or if there were signals of other EU countries setting lax caps. Then, 
an assessment will be made as to whether it is plausible that this lead to an 
understanding in Germany that the EU-15 does little and then we do not have to do 
much either. This may be formulated in the following manner: 
P6: Learning from the climate performance of other EU countries may have taken 
place. German decision-makers may have learnt that EU Member States do little for 
climate protection and decided that it should also not do much on this. This learning 
and preference change may contribute to explaining decreasing German climate 
policy strength.  
 
To sum up the model:  
 
Figure 2-6 Explanatory model: elaboration on the external factors 
Internal and External Factors 
National Climate Policy 
Strength  
External factors 
5. Changes in EU climate/energy policy 
6. Learning from EU countries climate 
performance 
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2.3.5 Summing up on theoretical approach 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework i.e. that is the understanding of the 
dependent variable and the different independent variables. This can be summarised:  
 
Figure 2-7 Explanatory model fully elaborated 
2.4 On the Empirical Material: Sources and How Sources 
are Treated, Reliability and Validity 
This section presents the empirical material of this study and discusses its quality. An 
overall assessment of the sources will be given but the main emphasis will be on my 
own data, the interviews. Validity is here understood as the quality of the 
interpretations and if the project’s conclusions are confirmed in other research 
(Thagaard 2003: 21). Reliability is understood as the quality of the sources of 
information; whether the research is conducted in a confident manner (ibid.: 178). 
Reliable data is important if the interpretations of the study are to be considered as 
valid. Thus high reliability can be understood as one precondition for high validity. 
This thesis assesses whether there has been changes in policy strength and which 
developments in this period account for this change. Thus, focus is on what actually 
happened. Dahl (1980) and Yin (2003) have formulated criteria on treatment of 
sources when the purpose of the study is to say something about actual developments. 
Internal and External Factors 
National Climate Policy Strength  
 
Internal factors 
1. Learning from domestic climate 
performance 
2. Abatement costs 
3. Power balance in government 
4. Power balance pressure groups 
External factors 
5. Changes in EU climate/energy policy 
6. Learning from EU countries climate 
performance 
Climate Ambitiousness dimension 
National and sectoral climate targets 
Policy Instrument Strength dimension 
Bindingness, specificity, scope and 
compliance mechanisms 
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These criteria and related validity and reliability assessments will be mentioned when 
relevant in the text below.  
2.4.1 Multiple sources of information 
This thesis relies on multiple sources of information: official documents, books, 
articles, statistics and information from home pages, for instance the BMU home 
page, and statements of different interest groups. In addition the study relies on series 
of semi-formal interviews conducted 15. – 23. March in Bonn and Berlin and 
information gathered at a German Emissions Trading Conference33 March 14, 2006. 
Given the limitation to studying the strength of federal climate policy output, the 
chapter describing the changes in policy strength relies on federal official documents: 
i.e. the climate programs, the national allocation plan, the agreement between the 
industry and government, the ETS directive and laws transposing the ETS into 
German legislation.  
Different sources of information will be used in the sections mapping changes in the 
independent variables. Factors derived from different theories call for different 
sources. When assessing changes in economic conditions such as changes in 
unemployment and growth, official statistics are used. Interviews are one main source 
of information in the assessment of learning and changes in power balance. Different 
sources have different validity and reliability challenges. It can be argued that there 
are more sources of error related to interviews than to written sources/statistics; and 
therefore, the reliability and the validity may be more questionable. Hence, the 
selection of interviewees and the method of the interview are discussed more in detail. 
There are also validity challenges with statistics. Some statistics can be less suitable 
                                              
33
 The conference “Emissionshandel – Allokationsplan für die zweite Handelsperiode – NAP II” was arranged by KRdL: 
Kommission Reinhaltung der Luft in VDI and DIN in cooperation with the BMU and the Umwelt Bundes Amt, DEHSt.  
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since they were compiled for other purposes. This will be discussed at the appropriate 
places in the thesis.  
Secondary sources such as books and articles about German climate policy and the 
EU ETS are used in this study. It can be argued that primary sources are preferable to 
secondary sources (Dahl 1973: 75). However, it has not always been possible to find 
primary sources, and developments in German climate policy are complex. As a 
supplement to primary sources, (including interviews), secondary sources can also be 
beneficial. Given the focus on changes in the period 2000-2005, especially the 
situation 2000 may not be recalled in detail. Generally, different sources of 
information are used to double check information. This enabled misunderstandings, 
misinterpretations and inaccuracies to be cleared up. This strengthens the reliability of 
the data. Moreover, it has been argued that such triangulation of data sources also 
increases validity (Dahl 1973: 74, Yin 2003: 99).  
2.4.2 On the planning, conduction and treatment of information 
from interviews 
Overall, 11 interviews were conducted in Bonn and Berlin in the period 15-23 of 
March 2006.  The goal was to interview people from four groups: ENGOs, industry 
companies and industry associations, federal ministries and research institutes. 
Researchers from DIW Berlin, Wuppertal and the Free University were included in 
this sample as it was assumed that they could supply valuable background information 
and a possibility to cross-check information. This was very valuable. The three first 
groups where chosen because they are important players in German climate policy. 
Thus, their reflection on changes in their power/power changes of the other groups 
and on learning could be an important source of information.  
Climate policy has a cross-sector character. The Ministry of Environment has the 
coordinating role, and an interview here was most important. The other ministries are 
responsible for policy instruments in their sector. An interview in the Ministry of 
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Economics was seen as beneficial given the focus on changing instruments in energy 
and industry sector. One interview was conducted in the BMU. Unfortunately, it was 
not possible to obtain an interview in the BMWI. I conducted interviews with 
representatives from two important industry companies E.ON and Vattenfall, and two 
industry federations The Federation of German Industries (BDI) and The Chemical 
Industry Federation (VCI). Moreover, interviews were conducted in three of the most 
important ENGOs: World Wide Found for Nature (WWF), Friends of the Earth 
Germany (BUND) and Germanwatch. A goal was to have a balanced representation 
of Green and Grey forces’ views. An interview in the BMWI was not possible. 
However, I participated at an emissions trading conference where different industry 
groups were present34. Hence, it can be claimed that a fairly balanced presentation of 
views was attained.  
For the selection of interviewee, the individuals should have been working with 
climate policy issues. This was confirmed although some of the interviewees were 
quite new in their positions. This can be problematic, because as Dahl has argued, if 
one would like to know what actually happened, it is best to hear it from someone 
who was actually there (Dahl 1973: 59). However, this can also be positive since new 
employees may not be that socialised into the thinking of their organisation and may 
thus have a more critical stance. Moreover, some interviewees had been in their 
position throughout the whole period under investigation. Furthermore, the 
information has been cross-checked. Thus, this is not seen as a validity problem.    
An interview guide was made; it was seen as important to ask the same questions so 
that comparison and thus triangulation of information was possible. However, it was 
considered important that the questions were relevant for the interviewee. Dahl has 
argued that whether the information can be used to say something about actual 
                                              
34
 Different industry branches covered by the EU ETS participated at this conference: power, aluminum, lime, glass, 
ceramics, chemic and oil.   
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developments has to do with the ability of the interviewee to tell the truth (ibid.). 
Hence, individual adjustments were made to ensure that interviewees were not 
questioned on topics with which they were unfamiliar. Overall, this functioned well 
and this is not seen as a validity problem.  
Most of the interviews were taped35 and transcribed. Two interviews were more 
informal conversations with researchers and these interviews were not taped, although 
notes were taken during these interviews. Taping interviews increases the reliability 
(Thagaard 2003: 178), although it might affect the interviewees’ answers. Dahl (1973: 
69) has pointed at the interviewees will to tell the truth is central if the information is 
to be used to say something about actual developments. Taping interviews can affect 
the interviewees will to tell the truth. However, the impression was that the 
interviewees were open and not falling into rhetoric and “correct” answers. Thus, it 
can be argued that the taping of interviews strengthened reliability and did not weaken 
validity.   
The interviews were conducted in English but the interviewees were informed about 
my German language and climate terminology skills. Thus, the interviewees could 
speak German if they did not know the English terminology. One interview was 
conducted entirely in German. Being able to communicate in two languages made it 
possible to clear up potential misunderstandings/misinterpretations, and I would argue 
that this strengthened the reliability of the data.    
Overall, the quality of the empirical material is assessed as good and it can be argued 
that the approach of using multiple sources has strengthened the validity.  
                                              
35
 Transcribed interviews and notes from non-taped interviews are archived. Based on this material matrixes were made 
with information sorted according to themes, these matrixes were also achieved. 
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3 Baseline: German Climate Policy Strength 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first research question: Has there been a change in 
German climate policy strength from 2000 to 2005?  
The chapter commences with a section on German climate policy in the 1990s. The 
second and third sections investigate the 2000 climate program and the national 
allocation plan/the 2005 climate program. The focus is on the two dimensions of 
policy strength presented in Chapter 2: climate ambitiousness dimension and policy 
instrument strength dimension. The amount of emission reductions that is to be made, 
overall and for each sector, are discussed in the assessment of climate ambitiousness. 
The discussion on policy instrument strength starts out with a brief overview on the 
strength of the policy mix and its main instrument. Here, Vedung’s principle degree 
of authoritative force will be taken as point of departure. After this, a more detailed 
assessment will be given focusing on the sub-dimensions bindingness, specificity, 
scope and compliance mechanisms. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the main focus will 
be on assessing the main instrument in the policy mix, that is the VAs in 2000 and the 
EU ETS in 2005. Both instruments target the energy and industry sector and point 
sources. This makes them suitable for comparison.  
The fourth section discusses whether the 2005 climate policy strength is stronger or 
weaker than that in 2000. Moreover, the scores will be interpreted and the scores on 
the dependent variable that the next chapter will seek to explain are presented.  
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3.2 Backdrop: German Climate Policy in the 1990s 
Germany was the first important industrialised country to adopt a specific reduction 
target within a time frame (Hasselmeier and Wettestad 2000: 5). By 1990 the country 
had already adopted a domestic CO2 reduction target whereby the nation was to 
reduce its emissions by 25% before 2005 with a 1987 baseline (ibid.: 1). In 1997/8 
Germany took on an international climate commitment under the Kyoto protocol and 
the EU burden-sharing arrangement. The country was to reduce the emissions of a 
basket of six greenhouse gases by 21% in the period 2008-2012 compared with 1990 
levels (Oberthür and Ott 1999: 148). This is one of the most ambitious targets in the 
EU Burden-Sharing. Only Luxembourg has a higher reduction target, Denmark 
having the same target as Germany.  
Germany approached the climate challenge with a set of regulations that had been 
tried and tested in other policy fields. Three types of command and control policy 
instruments were preferred: environmental laws, ordinances and technical 
specifications (Bang et al. 2004: 11). Moreover, voluntary agreements had broad 
support (ibid.). Before COP 1 in Berlin, the federal government asked industry to set a 
CO2 reduction target on a voluntary basis. In 1995–1996 The BDI and the 
government made an agreement whereby industry should reduce its emissions by 20% 
before 2005 with a 1990 baseline. In return, the government promised not to take 
initiatives to achieve the reduction targets by command and control measures. To 
monitor the agreement an independent third party was introduced: the Rheinish-
Westfälisches Institute for economic research (RWI) (Watanabe 2005: 25-26). 
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3.3  “Initial “German Climate Policy Strength: The 2000 
National Climate Program  
3.3.1 Assessing policy strength: the climate ambitiousness 
dimension 
How ambitious was the 2000 climate program overall? A prognosis showed that with 
the policy instruments already in place a 15-17% CO2 emission reduction was 
estimated for the year 2005 (BMU 2000b: 8). The policy mix in the 2000 climate 
program, with the new policies and measures, was to lead to a 25% CO2 reduction 
before 2005 (ibid.: 25). This would mean a reduction in line with the domestic climate 
target. Compared to the business as usual scenario (BAU), this is ambitious.  
How ambitious was the 2000 climate program in terms of sector reduction? 
According to a 1997 projection, emissions could decrease by some 16% in the energy 
transformation sector, 35% in the industry sector and 20% in the residential and 
institutional sectors. The emissions in transport sector were expected to increase by 
some 28% during the same period (OECD 2001: 194)36. The target for the energy and 
industry (including commercial) sector was to reduce CO2 emissions by 20-25 million 
tonnes, transport sector by 15-20 million tonnes residential sector by 18-25 million 
tonnes, all before 2005 (BMU 2000b: 85-86). Annual estimates for CO2 reductions 
would be 4-5 million tonnes in the energy and industry sector, 3-4 million tonnes in 
transport sector, 3.6-5 million tonnes in residential sector. Compared to the BAU 
scenario, most of sector targets are ambitious; that for especially the transport sectors 
target is particularly ambitious. Moreover, the climate program was estimated to lead 
to a 26% reduction in CO2 equivalents by 2005, a 32% reduction by 2010, and a 45% 
                                              
36
 The difference between these two projections was that the latter is based on policies and measures already implemented 
in 1999, but does not take into account the 1999 eco-tax reform and the 2000 Renewable Energies Act (OECD 2001: 194). 
The other takes into account measures implemented between 1999 and the 2000 climate program. Hence, the estimates of 
the 1997 projections will be slightly lower.  
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reduction by 2020 (ibid.: 88).  Hence, the program was estimated to lead to an over-
fulfilment of the German commitment under the EU burden-sharing arrangement.
 
The overall targets of the main policy instrument, the VAs, were to reduce the 
industry’s emission of all greenhouse gases by 35% by 2012 as compared to 1990 and 
to reduce CO2 emissions by 28% by 2005 as against 1990 (Federal Government 
2000). It is difficult to compare this target to the BAU scenario since different 
branches have different targets which aggregate to this overall target. However, it was 
argued that targets of most of the branches were close to BAU and hence not 
ambitious. One exception was the targets for the energy sector (Interviews). Hence, it 
can be argued that the VAs was quite ambitious. Moreover, the overall targets of the 
2000 climate program can be claimed to be ambitious. 
 
3.3.2 Assessing policy strength: the policy instrument strength 
dimension 
This section commences with a brief overview of the strength of the 2000 climate 
policy mix and the main instrument, the voluntary agreements. Then, the policy mix 
and especially the voluntary agreements will be given a more detailed assessment by 
focusing of their bindingness, specificity, scope and compliance mechanisms. 
3.3.2.1 The 2000 climate policy mix and its main instrument, the 
voluntary agreements 
More than 100 measures for greenhouse gas reduction are listed in the 2000 climate 
program. The program includes all Vedungs types of policy instruments: regulations, 
economic means and the instrument information. Economic instruments have not 
been used very much in German climate policy (Michaelowa 2003: 34). However, the 
2000 policy mix includes two important economic instruments: the environmental tax 
reform from 1999, and combined heat and power. The instrument of information is 
also not much used in German climate policy in contrast, for instance, to American 
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climate policy. Germany has a strong regulatory tradition and command and control 
measures are important in the combination.  
The voluntary agreements were renewed and expanded in 2000, and most observers 
have argued that the VAs were the backbone of German climate policy. The VAs 
covered 80% of the industry’s energy consumption as well as, large parts of the 
energy consumption in the residential and commercial sector through the participation 
of the gas-oil and electricity production (Federal Government 2000). How can this 
instrument be classified in accordance with Vedung’s typology? It has been argued 
that VAs are more constraining than information but less constraining than economic 
means, and hence that it can be placed between these two categories (Skjærseth 2000: 
60). Hence, the typology will be extended by one more category. Table 3-1 shows a 
classification of some of the most important policy instruments in 2000 in accordance 
with this extended typology of policy instrument.  
Table 3-1  2000 Climate program policy instruments classified 
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3.3.2.2 A more detailed assessment: the sub-dimensions of policy 
instrument strength 
 Bindingness 
With regard to bindingness the climate program in itself is only a declaration of 
intent, and therefore not legally binding.  The government only states that a certain 
level of CO2 and of the other Kyoto protocol greenhouse gases shall be reduced 
within a certain time frame and introduces instruments by which these reductions 
shall be made. Policy instruments like the eco-tax, the combined heat and power and 
the renewable energies act are legally binding. These are all important instruments in 
the policy mix. Instruments like information campaigns are not binding.
 
It has been argued that the German VAs are not legally binding; the industry merely 
declares that it will try to cut emissions, thus committing itself only to the effort. 
Hence, it is a declaration of intent and thus not legally binding (Rodi 2005: 190-191).  
Specificity 
The 2000 climate program mentions two climate targets, the 25% national CO2 target 
and the 21% Kyoto GHG target. Moreover, the program contained indicative sector 
targets, for the first time in Germany (BMU 2000a). The VAs, had both quantified 
targets and timetables. However, the VAs consists of many different agreements, 
responsibility being borne by 19 industrial associations (Federal Government 2000). 
These agreements are defined according to various criteria and different 
sectors/industrial associations have different reduction targets. Some of the reduction 
targets go beyond the total declaration (ibid.). It can be pointed out that this makes the 
system complex and non-transparent. 
Scope 
In the 2000 climate program all greenhouse gases are included. However, it has been 
claimed that fluorinated gases are poorly treated in this program (Michaelowa 2000). 
Moreover, the climate program covers different sectors of the economy and 
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introduces many new instruments and intensifies others. Hence, the scope in regard to 
gases will be assessed as quite broad and the scope in regard of sectors as broad, in 
total the scope of the climate program is assessed as quite broad. 
The voluntary agreement covered 80% of the industry’s energy consumption and also 
large parts of the energy consumption in the residential and commercial sector 
(Federal Government 2000). This is a quite broad scope. Moreover, the VAs covered 
all greenhouse gases. Thus, the scope in regard of gases is broad. Hence, the scope of 
the VAs is assessed as quite broad.  
Compliance mechanisms 
In the VAs it is stated that the declarations of the individual industrial associations is 
to be regularly checked by both parties on the basis of monitoring reports by an 
independent third party, RWI (ibid.). Third party involvement makes the monitoring 
regime stronger than if the system was only based on industrial self-reporting. 
Moreover, it is declared that monitoring should enable adjustment to the objectives if 
necessary as well as further development of the individual declarations (ibid.). The 
VAs mentions no sanctions in the case of industrial associations being in non-
compliance with the targets. It is nevertheless declared that as long as the agreement 
is successfully implemented and jointly developed, the federal government will not 
take initiatives to achieve emission reductions through regulations (ibid.). An implicit 
sanction is expressed here: if reductions are not made due to voluntary agreements 
command and control measures will be introduced.  
All aspects taken into consideration, it can be argued that even though there is third 
party involvement and an implicit sanction, the enforcement system of the VAs is not 
particularly strict. 
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3.3.3 Summing up: 2000 German climate policy strength 
Table 3-2 summarises the discussion on the 2000 climate programs policy strength. 
Table 3-2 2000 Climate policy strength 
Policy instrument strength 2000 Climate 
Program 


























Targets close to 
BAU, energy 
sector target 
more ambitious  
Policy mix Many 
regulations, 
however, VAs 
are not binding 
Targets, 
Timetables, also 




VAs has weak 
penalties  
All sectors, all 









The table shows that the 2000 climate program was stronger on climate targets than 
on policy instruments. 
3.4 German Climate Policy Strength 2004 – 2005: the 
National Allocation Plan/2005 National Climate 
Program 
3.4.1 Assessing policy strength: the climate ambitiousness 
dimension 
In the 2002 Red-Green coalition government declaration, a new domestic reduction 
target was introduced: Germany is to reduce the emissions of all GHG by 40% before 
2020 if the EU as a whole commits itself to a 30% reduction within the same time 
frame (Federal Government 2002: 27). The national allocation plan and the 2005 
climate program take the 21% CO2 reduction target of the Kyoto/EU burden-sharing 
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as point of departure, and not the more ambitious domestic 40% target, when defining 
the overall target and targets for different sectors37. The climate program does not 
discuss why the 25% CO2 reduction target was not attained. Moreover, in the program 
no additional measures are introduced to acquire an over-fulfilment of the Kyoto 
target or that the conditional 40% target is within reach. The only thing that is stated 
is that reaching the Kyoto levels will pave way for more ambitious targets in the 
future, and that Germany will try to make the EU commit itself to a stricter target 
(ibid.: 50).    
 
The energy and industry sector, i.e. emissions trading sector38 is to reduce the CO2 by 
2 million tonnes, commercial sector by 3 million tonnes and residential and transport 
sector can increase the emissions with 1 million tonne, all before 2007. In annually 
estimated numbers this means that energy and industry shall reduce by 0.67 million 
tonnes, commercial by 1 tonne, residential and transport can increase by 0.33 million 
tonnes. The target of the energy and industry sector is possibly the least ambitious. 
The base period was warmer than average leading to the fact that CO2 emissions of 
private households were about 10 million tonnes CO2 under the levels expected under 
normal climate conditions (Matthes and Schafhausen forthcoming: 8). Hence, the 
level of emissions to be reached in this sector could be harder to reach.  Moreover, 
there were two BAU scenarios in 2004. A RWI study assumed only a minimal 
reduction in emissions up to 2012 from industry and energy. Moreover, it assumed 
considerable emission reductions in sectors not covered by emissions trading, above 
all in the transport sector. In the policy scenario III study a pattern of development 
diametrically opposed to this is assumed (ibid.: 9-10). If the latter is correct, then it is 
the non-emission trade sectors targets that are the target which will be hardest to 
achieve.  
                                              
37
 The NAP sets caps for the emissions trading sector and for the non-emissions trading sector (BMU 2004). The Allocation 
Act 2007 (ZuG 2007) sets caps for sectors within the non-emissions trading sector. The 2005 climate program confirms the 
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In summary, the overall target is less ambitious than the 25% target that was left. The 
cap is assessed as not very ambitious.  
3.4.2 Assessing policy strength: the policy instrument strength 
dimension 
The first section below gives a brief overview of the strength of the 2005 climate 
policy instrument mix and its main instrument, the emissions trading scheme. The 
second section gives a closer assessment by focusing on the sub-dimensions 
bindingness, specificity, scope and compliance mechanisms. 
3.4.2.1 The 2005 climate policy instrument mix 
Similar to 2000 policy mix, that of 2005 is also complex, with all instrument types 
present. Furthermore, many policy instruments are still ongoing, among these the 
VAs. However, the VAs are not as central as before. With the National Allocation 
Plan of March 2004, the emissions trading instrument became the main instrument in 
the German climate policy mix (BMU 2005b: 4). Classification of emissions trading 
is not straight forward. This variant (cap and trade scheme) has a command and 
control element. The cap shall not be transcended, but if this does happen sanctions 
are imposed. What the companies choose to do to be in compliance, whether they 
choose internal abatements or buying allowances, is largely up to them. Thus, 
emissions trading is located somewhere between regulation and economic means, but 
it can be claimed that it is closer to the latter. The 2005 climate program focuses on 
the sectors not included in emissions trading and especially the residential and 
transport sector. Table 3.3 below shows some of the most important instruments in the 
2005 climate policy combination. 
                                                                                                                                           
targets defined in the NAP and the ZuG 2007 (BMU 2005b: 5-6). This is also the case for sectors not participating in 
emission trade. Thus, the climate program is oriented towards the 21% target (ibid.: 4).  
38
 I equate the emissions trading sector with the energy and industry sector. This is a simplification. Almost all installations 
in the energy and industry sector are covered by the scheme, and some installations in other sectors are also covered.  
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Table 3-3 2005 Climate program policy instruments classified 
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3.4.2.2 A more detailed assessment: the sub-dimensions of policy 
instrument strength  
Bindingness 
The 2005 climate program is only a declaration of intent and not legally binding. 
Moreover, the policy instruments differ in regard to bindingness; information 
campaigns are not binding whereas the eco-tax, renewable energies act, CHP are 
examples of legally binding instruments.  
In contrast to voluntary agreements emission trading is legally binding. Like other 
directives, the EU Emissions trading directive has a legally binding status once 
implemented into German law. In Germany, the EU emission trading directive was 
transposed into national legislation by two laws and two ordinances. The laws were 
the Greenhouse gas Emission Allowance Trading Law (TEHG) and the Allocation 
Law 2005-2007 (ZuG 2007). The two ordinances were the Allocation Ordinance 
2005-2007 (ZuV) and the Costs Ordinance (EHKostV) (Umweltbundesamt DEHSt 
2005: 3).  
Specificity 
The 2005 climate program has targets and timetables for the country as such and for 
each sector. In regard to emissions trading instrument, article 7 of the TEHG states 
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that the federal government shall make a national allocation plan for each period 
stating the total quantity of allowances that shall be allocated in this period39. Thus, it 
can be argued that the emissions trading instrument follows a target and timetable 
approach.  
Moreover, the EU ETS directive declares that the Member States shall provide for the 
establishment and maintenance of a registry (European Commission 2003: Article 
19). In the TEHG it is declared that an authority shall lead an emissions trading 
registry. This registry shall have form of a standardized electronic databank. Every 
company with installation covered by the scheme has an account where every issuing, 
holding, transfer and cancellation of allowances is registered. The registry shall also 
be accessible to the public (TEHG: Article 14). Hence, at the outset the emissions 
trading scheme is potentially quite transparent. The transparency of the system could 
serve as an incentive for operators not wanting to be ‘shamed and blamed’.  
The German allocation law, ZuG 2007, permitted the greatest possible flexibility in 
applying for allowances. The law includes several allocation rules, both general rules 
and special provisions40. It has been argued that the many allocation rules and the 
many possible combinations of the rules make the system less transparent 
(Umweltbundesamt DEHSt 2005: 13).   
In summary, the emissions trading instrument follows a target and timetable 
approach; the registry offers transparency but the many allocation rules make the 
system less transparent.  
                                              
39
 This is a blueprint of what is stated in the EU ETS directive. 
40
 The general rules were that companies had to apply for allowances based on their historical emissions of the base period 
or according to emissions prognosis. The most important special rules include taking into account early actions, process 
emissions, combined heat and power, shut-down of nuclear plants. 
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Scope 
The 2005 climate program covers all sectors of the economy and all greenhouse 
gases. However, it does not introduce many new instruments and it only slightly 
intensifies existing instruments. If one looks at the emission reduction trends of 
different sectors, these were growing in residential sector, so it can be seen as 
problematic that not more/intensified instruments were introduced here41.  
The new main policy instrument, the emissions trading instrument, only covers CO242. 
But the instrument covers 58% of the country’s CO2 emissions and CO2 amounts to 
90% of total GHG emissions in Germany (BMU 2002b: 43). Moreover, if one looks 
at the different GHG emission trends of Germany, the reduction figures for the other 
GHG were more positive than for CO243.  Hence for Germany the ETS CO2-only 
approach is more ambitious than a 6-GHG approach44. In the energy and industry 
sector almost 95% of all installations are covered by the scheme. In addition, some 
installations in other sectors are covered (BMU 2005b: 48). In summary, the ETS can 
be argued to have a broad scope.
 
The 2005 climate program does not introduce many new or intensified instruments in 
the residential sector. However, since the main instrument in the program has an 
ambitious scope, overall, it can be argued that the scope of the policy mix is quite 
ambitious. 
 
                                              
41
 Given emission reduction trends, the program can be argued as being too weak on instruments in the residential sector. 
Had it not been for the EU ETS the scope in regard to the energy sector would also have been weak.  
42
 In the pilot phase (2005-2007) of the scheme only CO2 is covered, however in the Kyoto phase other gases might be 
introduced.  
43
 See the 2005 Climate Program pp. 10 (BMU 2005b).   
44
 It can also be argued that at an only-CO2 approach is more ambitious than all 6 greenhouse gases of the Kyoto  
Protocol approach since a 6-GHG approach would make the instrument more complex and thus less transparent.  
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Compliance mechanisms 
With the new emissions trading instrument, economic means and regulations 
dominate over voluntary agreements and the instrument of information in the 2005 
policy mix.  
Concerning the emissions trading instrument, the Commission has made guidelines 
for monitoring and reporting. The EU ETS directive declares that the Member States 
shall ensure that emissions are monitored in accordance with these guidelines; that 
every operator of an installation reports the emissions from that installation (European 
Commission 2003: Article 14). Moreover, it declares that Member States shall ensure 
that these reports are verified (ibid.: Article 15). In Germany this is the responsibility 
of the German Emission Trading Authority (DEHSt).  
TEHG Articles 17 and 18 state that by the end of April every year plant operator must 
surrender allowances to cover their actual emissions in the year. If a plant operator 
does not surrender sufficient allowances, a financial penalty will be levied per non-
surrendered allowance. This penalty is set to 100 euros. However, in the first period it 
is set to 40 euros. There is also a hard ship clause for this first period45. In addition to 
the financial penalty, the non-delivered allowance would have to be deducted from 
the allocated budget of the plant in the following year. Moreover, the names of those 
who are in non-compliance will be published (TEHG: Article 17 and 18). These 
sanctions are blueprints of those mentioned in the EU directive. 
The EU ETS is actually the first time EU environmental legislation mandates member 
states to impose a penalty on the Member States own firms if they are in non-
compliance (Zapfel 2005: 173). The compliance regime of the EU emissions trading 
scheme is quite strict, although in the period 2005-7 there is a hardship clause and the 
penalty is lower. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the possibility of this penalty 
                                              
45
 Member states may apply to the Commission for certain installation s to be issued with additional allowances in case of 
force majeure (European Commission 2003: Article 29).  
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should also serve as a strong incentive for operators to surrender enough allowances, 
since it will be much higher than the market price. The firms also have to make it up 
again in the next period. Publishing the names of those who are in non-compliance is 
an example of shaming and blaming.  
It is clear that the compliance regime of the emission trading instrument is strict. With 
emissions trading and regulations dominating the policy mix, the policy is quite 
constraining. 
3.4.3 Summing up: German climate policy strength 2004-2005 
Table 3-4 summarises the discussion on the NAP/2005 climate programs climate 
policy strength. 
Table 3-4 2004/2005 Climate policy strength 
Policy Instrument strength NAP/  
2005 Climate 
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Overall, the NAP/2005 climate program seems quite strong on climate policy 
instruments although weaker on climate ambitiousness. This is assessed more closely 
in the following section where the 2004 NAP/2005 climate program is compared with 
the 2000 climate program.  
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3.5 2004/2005 Compared to 2000: a Change in National 
Climate Policy Strength? 
This section compares the 2004 NAP/2005 climate program’s ambitiousness and 
policy instrument strength with that of the 2000 climate program. The question is 
raised whether the 2004 NAP/2005 climate program when compared with that of 
2000 meant a strengthening or weakening of the climate policy mix, and hence if 
there have been changes in German climate policy strength from 2000 to 2004/2005.  
3.5.1 Changes along the climate ambitiousness dimension? 
Has there been a change along the climate ambitiousness dimension from the 2000 
climate program to the NAP/ 2005 climate program? Table 3-5 shows the percentage 
reductions in CO2 and GHG, both with a 1990 baseline. 
Table 3-5 GHG and CO2 reductions in 2000 and 2004/2005 
 National Climate 
Program 2000 
NAP/  National climate 
program 2005 
% CO2 reduction with a 
1990 baseline 
25% in 2005 15% in 2007, 17% in 
2010 
% GHG reduction with a 
1990 baseline 
26% in 2005, 32% in 
2010, 45% in 2020 
21% in 2010 
 
Comparing the data in the table above we see a quite remarkable reduction in 
ambitiousness has taken place. The 2000 climate program was to lead to larger 
reductions of all GHG and of CO2 in 2005 than what the NAP/2005 climate program 
is intended to do by 2010.  
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Table 3-6 showing the annual estimated CO2 reduction for each sector in million 
tonnes (the numbers are averages). 
Table 3-6 Annual estimated CO2 reduction 2000 and 2004/2005 in mill. tonnes 
CO2 reductions 2000 National Climate Program National Allocation Plan/2005 











The table shows that overall the ambitiousness has declined although it is problematic 
that the sector divisions in 2000 and in 2004 do not coincide.  
Concerning the main instrument in the policy mix, the VAs are more ambitious in 
terms of amount of CO2 to be reduced than emissions trading. It has been shown 
(Matthes and Schafhausen forthcoming: 12) that the cap for the emission trading 
sector is about 15 million tones higher than a cap based on the VAs.  
In summary, the ambition of the NAP/2005 climate program is lower than that of the 
2000 climate program. This relates both to the overall targets and the sector targets. 
Moreover, the ambition of the emissions trading is considerably lower than for the 
VAs. 
3.5.2 Changes along the policy instrument strength dimension? 
Comparing the 2005 climate program with the climate program of 2000, there were 
not many new or intensified instruments. The ETS had replaced the VAs as the main 
instrument in the policy instrument mix. What did this change mean in terms of 
bindingness, specificity, scope and compliance mechanisms? Firstly, the ETS is 
legally binding whereas the VAs were only declarations of intent and thus not 
binding.  
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Both the VAs and the emission trade instrument have quantified targets and 
timetables. The VAs is non-transparent with the many different agreements based on 
different criteria. The emissions-trading instrument, as implemented in Germany, is 
also quite complex with many allocation rules. However, compared to the VAs, the 
registry of the ETS improves the transparency somewhat suggesting that the 
specificity of the ETS was better than that of the VAs (as an indication of policy 
strength).   
The compliance regime of the emissions- trading instrument is manifestly stricter than 
that of the VAs. The ETS has strict monitoring, reporting and verification practises. 
Moreover, it has listing of non-compliant operators and most importantly, quite 
substantial financial penalties. This is in contrast to the VAs, which have an implicit 
sanction of introducing stronger instrument if the goal is not reached.  
In regard of scope, similarly to 2000, all sectors and all gases were included in 2005 
and many different policy instruments were used. But in contrast to the VAs the 
emission trade instrument only covers CO2. Since the reduction trends of the other 
GHG are more positive, this makes the ETS scope more ambitious. However, the 
2005 climate program does not include many new instruments in the residential 
sector. Nevertheless, ETS covers the important energy sector. All aspects taken into 
consideration the scope in 2005 is assessed as slightly broader than that of 2000. 
3.5.3 Summing up: changes along the climate ambitiousness and 
policy instrument strength dimension? 
There has been a change along the policy instrument strength dimension from 2000 to 
2005. The policy instrument strength in 2005 is a stronger than that of 2000. This is 
mainly because the emissions-trading instrument is binding, slightly more specific, 
has a more ambitious scope and stronger compliance mechanisms than the voluntary 
agreements. The ETS was the exception in 2005; otherwise only very few new 
instruments were introduced or intensified in the 2005 climate program. There has 
also been a change in the period along the climate ambitiousness dimension. The 
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NAP/2005 climate program is considerably less ambitious in regard to emission 
targets: the 2000 program aimed at a 25% CO2 reduction, while the NAP/2005 
climate program had left the 25% target for the less ambitious international 21% 
GHG target. Moreover, the cap for energy and industry sector under emissions trading 
is less ambitious than a cap in line with the VAs.  
Table 3-7 summarises the main developments in German climate policy strength from 
2000 to 2004/2005.  
Table 3-7 2004/ 2005 Climate policy strength as compared to 2000  
Policy instrument strength dimension 
 









Stronger Less ambitious 2004 NAP/ 2005 climate 
program as compared to 
2000 climate program Stronger/slightly stronger Less ambitious 
 
Two converse developments have taken place in the period: climate ambitiousness 
has decreased while policy instrument strength has increased. What does this say 
about policy strength? It is this question to which we turn in the following. 
3.6 Conclusion: Interpretation of Converse Policy Strength 
Developments and Specifying the Dependent Variable  
How can these converse developments in climate policy strength be interpreted? 
Could it be that Germany decided to have stronger instruments in order to catch up for 
lost time? Could it be that the decision-makers focused on stronger instruments rather 
than ambitious targets, thinking that with strong instruments the targets would be 
reached, and this was better than not being able to reach any target at all?  
As many studies have shown; the German government did not want the EU ETS. It 
led a campaign against the ETS at the EU level as late as in 2002 (Wettestad and 
Sæverud 2005: 11). Moreover, German industry, through the BDI and VCI, lobbied 
heavily on the German position and at the EU level institutions through UNICE, their 
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EU level peak organisation (Butzengeiger et al. 2003: 221, Lefevre 2005: 103, 
Interviews). There were groups in Germany that wanted emissions trading: the Green 
party, the BMU, ENGOs and companies such as BP and Deutsche Bank (Lefevre 
2005: 103, Interviews). However, Watanabe (2005) has shown that when Germany 
finally adopted the ETS directive, this was not due to a change of preferences by 
majority of German decision-makers, but more to the fact that Germany would have 
been outvoted. The decision was under the qualified majority voting rule, and the 
other EU countries wanted (and needed) the ETS. Those interviews in this study 
confirmed this view: Germany adopting the ETS was due to the multilayered 
governance system. The largest EU-15 country was mainly forced to approve a strong 
policy instrument.  
Above, it has been pointed at Germany adopting the ETS was the element which 
made the 2005 policy mix stronger than that of 2000.Given the reason for Germany 
adopting the ETS, it seems as though the most puzzling development in this period 
and thus the most interesting to explain with internal (national, sub-national) and 
external factors, is the decrease in climate ambitiousness. However, being a strong 
instrument, the ETS might have contributed to this development by making the costs 
clearer and creating resistance among targeted groups. Moreover, explaining the 
reduction in climate ambitiousness may also shed some light on why Germany did not 
want a stronger policy instrument. However, this is not the main purpose of the study. 
Summing up, the study seeks to explain decreasing climate ambitiousness, i.e. two 
developments: 1) Reduction in overall climate target: why the 25% CO2 target was 
abandoned for the 21% GHG target; 2) Reduction of climate target for the energy and 
industry sector: Why one got a cap under the ETS that was less ambitious than that 
based on the VAs.  
When did these two climate ambitiousness developments take place? The 25% CO2 
target was included in the 2002 coalition declaration and the 2002 national 
communication to the UNFCCC:  it was not present in the January 2004 NAP draft. 
Thus, it seems like the 25% target was left in the period 2002 to 2004. The cap for the 
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energy and industry sector in the NAP draft was in line with the VAs while the cap in 
the final NAP of March 2004 was higher. Thus, the cap-increase occurred during a 
two-month period in 2004. 
The length of the time frames of these two developments is different. What kind of 
implications does this have? The 25% target was not left at a specific date. One can 
only draw causal inferences if one knows that the independent variable changed value 
before the change in value of the dependent variable took place. Since the exact time 
for the leaving of this target is somewhat uncertain causal inferences will have to be 
made with caution. Given this clarification, however, for simplicity reasons it will be 
assumed that the 25% target was left in January 2004 and that only explanatory 
factors which changed value before 2004 that might contribute to explain why this 
target was abandoned. There is also another implication of the time frames: the cap 
was increased during a two-month period. This could have been too short a period for 
using the explanatory model of this study: too short period for learning and preference 
change to take place, moreover one will not expect the power balance to shift in this 
period. Furthermore, it might be plausible, but, less likely that the decision-makers 
gained new information concerning abatement costs during these two months. Then, 
why is it interesting to explain the cap-increase?  
The decision to increase the cap is interesting because it can shed light on how 
general trends and changes in Germany materialises in a concrete decision. Events 
that took place in these two months can trigger other and longer working trends for 
instance changed preferences or groups that have been strengthened the last years. 
Hence, even if abandoning the overall target and the change of target for the energy 
and industry sector are two separate developments, there are good reasons for 
assuming that both developments are expressions of the same trend, and that the same 
forces will be behind these two developments. 
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4 Explaining Reduced Climate Ambitiousness 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the second research question: What has caused the change in 
German climate ambitiousness from 2000-2005? – i.e. which explanatory factors can 
account for this change? In the formulation of propositions it was taken as simplifying 
starting point that both climate ambitiousness and policy instrument strength had 
decreased. However, the discussion in chapter 3 showed that while climate 
ambitiousness has decreased, policy instrument strength has arguably increased in this 
period.  
As explained earlier, this study will seek to explain why climate ambitiousness has 
decreased, that is two developments: why the overall climate target has been reduced 
from a 25% CO2 target to the 21% GHG target, and why the energy and industry 
target has been reduced from a cap based on the VAs to a less ambitious cap. The first 
development took place over several years, the second development during just 2 
months in 2004. I will assume that both these developments can be explained by the 
factors chosen. However, since the cap was changed in short time, it is not reasonable 
to think that the factors have changed value in this period. Indeed, in this period, 
events might have taken place which have actualised these trends (factors with 
changed value). Alternatively, that longer trends became visible in the cap-process. 
Thus, the factors important in explaining why the 25% target was left may explain 
why events which happened in this period became important.  
In this chapter, each factor will first be discussed separately: any changes in the factor 
will be noted and whether such changes can explain decreasing climate 
ambitiousness. In the final part of the chapter the different factors will be discussed 
together and focus will be on how they have worked together and their relative 
importance in explaining decreased climate ambitiousness. 
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4.2 Internal Factors 
Focus is placed on four internal factors: learning from domestic experience, changes 
in abatement costs, changes in the power relationship between Green and Grey forces 
in government and changes in the power relationship between Green and Grey 
societal pressure groups.  
4.2.1 Learning from domestic experience 
The main assumption in regard to learning from domestic experience was: 
P1: Learning from domestic experience may have taken place. German decision-
makers may have learned that large reductions have been made, thus there was no 
need for ambitious climate policy (preference change). This learning and preference 
change may contribute to explain decreasing German climate ambitiousness. 
In the first section the question if there have been learning from domestic experience 
with GHG emission reductions and climate measures will be addressed. In the second 
section a discussion is entered into whether these domestic experiences can explain 
the changes in German climate ambitiousness.  
4.2.1.1 Have there been any changes at the domestic level 2000-
2005? 
The discussion about the national allocation plan really started in Germany in 2003 
(Zöckler 2004: 60).What was the status concerning the implementation of German 
climate targets at that time? Had the 2000 climate programme lead to CO2 reductions? 
And if so, were these reductions of such a size that the National Allocation Plan and 
the 2005 National Climate Programme did not have to be ambitious? The 
development in CO2 emissions in the period is shown in table 4-1.  
 59 
Table 4-1 CO2 developments (in mill tonnes) 1999-2003 per sector and overall  
CO2 emissions in 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Energy generation 351.6 364.0 368.9 378.1 385.1 
Industry 141.3 141.8 137.3 134.0 130.9 
Transport 181.9 178.3 174.6 172.5 166.5 
Residential 119.9 116.8 131.2 120.1 122.4 
Commercial 62.6 59.2 61.8 59.1 60.3 
Total emissions 857.4 860.0 873.8 863.8 865.3 
  Source: BMU 2005b 
During this period the total CO2 emissions have not been reduced but a stabilisation 
or a slight increase of the emissions has taken place. In the residential sector, and 
especially in the energy generation sector, emissions rose in this period: in the 
transport sector, industry sector and commercial sector, emissions decreased. Since 
1990 the emissions in the transport sector have increased. The above data show that 
Germany managed in to reverse this trend.  
If we look at the 25% national CO2 target, Germany had not come closer to this target 
by 2003; in fact the country had actually a slightly longer way to go.  
If we look at the Kyoto target, we have to take into account the development of the 
other five greenhouse gases of the Kyoto protocol. Statistics show that emissions from 
the other greenhouse gases have been reduced in the period. Different gases have 
experienced different developments and CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas 
(BMU 2005b: 10). In 1999 the six greenhouse gases altogether were reduced by 18.2 
% compared to 1990 levels. In 2003, the emissions from the six greenhouse gases 
were reduced by 18.5 % compared to the 1990 levels (ibid.: 10). This is slightly better 
than the situation prior to the climate program, but it was no remarkable emission 
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reduction. The reduction rate in prior periods was much higher, also without this 
ambitious climate programme.  
Germany is one of three countries which appear to be on course to meet their Kyoto 
burden-sharing targets with the measures already in place (Mullins and Karas 2003: 
11). Others, especially German environmental groups, have argued that the 21% 
target is not that easy to reach and with the measures already in place this target may 
not be reached (Interviews).  
How did the VAs, the main instrument in the 2000 climate program, function? By 
2005, 16 of the 17 branches had reached their targets, the exception being the most 
important sector, the energy sector (ibid.). A widely held opinion was that VAs work 
when it does not hurt, and when it hurts then it does not work! VAs give business as 
usual reductions (ibid.). Many argued that one of the reasons why the VAs were made 
was that the BMU minister at that time, Töpfer, needed to show something, and that 
industry wanted to escape from the ecological tax reform (ibid., Pehle 1997: 188). 
Others argued that the decision-makers were learning that more reductions would be 
hard; industry had to grow at some time (Interviews).  
What about the effect of the second most important policy instrument of the climate 
program, the combined heat and power? CHP had come far in the process but had not 
been introduced. There are many reasons for this46. Another factor that was 
mentioned as a reason for smaller emission reductions was that it was lacking money 
in order to undertake the energy modernisation in the household sector (ibid.). 
                                              
46
 Such as over-capacity of power plants in Germany, the agreed nuclear phase out next 15-20 years, power industry did not 
know which direction technology was to develop and were thus not willing to invest at that time (Interview). 
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4.2.1.2 Can learning from domestic experience explain decreasing 
climate ambitiousness? 
Was the decreased climate ambitiousness a result of successful German climate 
policy? Had so much emission reduction already taken place that an ambitious climate 
policy was no longer necessary? The GHG emission trends since 2000 paints another 
picture: CO2 emissions have not decreased, and for all the GHG in total there is only a 
slight decrease. Thus, a successful policy on emission reductions up until 2003 cannot 
explain decreasing climate ambitiousness.  
Had German decision-makers learnt that even if ambitious emission reductions were 
required, they were hard to achieve? Several of the interviewees argued that the 21% 
target showed a more realistic view on what was possible with the measures at hand 
(ibid.). It has been argued that the difference between the performance level and the 
aspiration level should not be too wide. Ambitious targets can be beneficial although 
if the target is too ambitious it is easily seen as neither realistic nor legitimate. Hence, 
can the decision on leaving the 25% target be explained by the fact that the decision-
makers learned that this gap was too big? I will argue that when answering this 
question the instruments at hand and available instruments, especially those in the 
important energy sector, will also have to be taken into account. 
 Did the country lack effective instruments or were there no such instrument 
available? On the one hand, German decision-makers had learned that the voluntary 
agreements did not result in large emission reductions. On the other, emissions 
trading was a strong instrument that could have helped Germany reaching its 
ambitious target. However, Germany wanted to keep the voluntary agreements and 
strongly opposed the introduction of the emissions trading and it cannot therefore be 
the case that decision-makers learned that there were no effective policy instruments 
available.  
Many interviewees argued that the political climate for large emission reductions 
were not favourable. As several of the interviewees pointed out: “It required the 
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political will which at that time was difficult for sure” (Interview). In a parliamentary 
discussion one Social Democratic Party (SPD) representative argued that energy 
efficiency improvements could be made with many lignite plants. Moreover, he 
maintained that a structural revolution in energy sector was not necessary for reaching 
the climate targets: the 21% target was possible to reach with only a slight structural 
change (Deutscher Bundestag: 2004: 8801). This seems to suggest that there was no 
will for deep structural changes such as phasing out coal47. To reach the 21% target, it 
was not necessary and neither was it seen as necessary, to over-achieve this target. 
The interviews gave the impression that the climate for an ambitious climate policy 
had worsened in this period. Thus, even if strong instruments were available, this was 
not seen as politically possible. Others pointed at decision-makers were learning that 
broader consensus was more important now. It was argued that this seeking for 
broader consensus may weaken the overall target (Interviews).  
Can learning from domestic experience with emission reductions explain the cap-
increase? As maintained earlier, decreasing ambitiousness cannot be explained by the 
many emission reductions already made making an ambitious policy not longer 
necessary. With the ETS, a low cap would most certainly lead to ambitious emission 
reductions (since the ETS instrument is a strong instrument). In regard to the 25% 
target, there is evidence indicating that an ambitious policy was politically 
problematic. It is likely that that also was the case in the cap-setting.  
Why had the decision-makers learned that it was not politically possible with an 
ambitious climate policy (ambitious targets and instruments)? Moreover, why was a 
broader consensus seen as more important now? Examination of some other important 
factors can shed further light on this. These questions will also be addressed in section 
4.4 where the factors are assessed together.  
                                              
47
 Germany has a tradition of subsidizing coal. This will be discussed more in detail in section 4.2.2.1 under fuel switch 
potential.   
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4.2.2 Abatement costs 
Let us recapitulate the second proposition on why this change in German climate 
ambitiousness has taken place: 
P2: Changes in decision-makers’ assessment of abatement costs may have taken 
place, for instance may decreasing energy efficiency potential increase abatement 
costs. These changes may contribute to explain decreasing German climate 
ambitiousness.  
First changes in abatement costs will be summarised. Second, the extent to which 
these changes explain the developments in German policy strength will be discussed.  
4.2.2.1 Increasing abatement costs? 
If the 2000 climate programme was implemented, what would this mean for the 
German economy? A comparison of a reference scenario with projections can give 
some indication of this. As mentioned earlier, the 2000 climate programme referred to 
a prognosis showing that with the policy instruments in place only a 15-17% CO2 
emission reduction would be reached. Moreover, with the 2000 program’s new 
measures, the 25% emission reductions would be achieved. Thus, it can be argued 
that the climate programme aimed at large reductions over short period. This indicates 
that abatement costs from implementing the programme could be high. Costs from 
abatement will largely depend on where the costs are concentrated. There are two 
important questions here: Are emissions concentrated in a sector with high fuel switch 
and energy efficiency potential? How important is this sector is for the national 
economy? In 2000, 41.2% of German CO2 emissions stemmed from the energy sector. 
The energy sector is also very important for the national economy of Germany. 
Energy efficiency is summarised below and an indication given whether the fuel 
switch potential has decreased in this period. An indication is also given of the change 
of main instrument from VAs to ETS and whether this meant a decrease in national 
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abatement costs. Lastly an indication is given as to whether the German economy’s 
ability to handle abatement costs has decreased.  
Decreasing energy efficiency potential? 
The East German industry was very inefficient. Mez and Watanabe (2004: 115) point 
out that approximately 500 billion Euros48 was used in the 1990s for the 
reconstruction and privatisation of the energy sector49. They further state that these 
instruments were one of the reasons for the unified Germany’s success in reducing 
CO2 emissions (Mez and Watanabe 2004: 115). Since energy efficiency 
improvements already made makes the marginal costs of new abatement higher 
(Fischer 1988: 228-229), this made the 2000 energy efficiency potential lower. 
However, in 2000, it was considered that there was still quite large energy efficiency 
potential (BMU 2000b: 21-22).  
Have there been changes that might have lead to a decrease in the energy efficiency 
potential? As maintained earlier, the liberalisation of the power market started in this 
period. The intent was that more competition should bring down energy prices. One 
effect of competition could be that companies would close energy inefficient plants. 
However, there were concerns that lower prices would be detrimental to the 
stimulation of energy efficiency (Wettestad 2005: 9). Thus, the picture on energy 
efficiency impacts of the liberalisation was not that clear cut. In 1998, the 
liberalisation process started in Germany (Erdmann 2000).The German market has 
historically enjoyed a certain diversity of power generation (Eikeland 2004: 10). After 
liberalisation, many power companies merged and the competition decreased (ibid.). 
However, since it was unclear whether an increased competition would stimulate 
energy efficiency improvements, this can also be said about a situation with decreased 
                                              
48
 Mez and Watanabe (2004: 115) point to the fact that this was not, as many argued, a free lunch, Germany had to spend 
hundreds of billions of euros on this.  
49
 Reconstruction and privatization of brown coal mining, establishment of competitive market for private companies in the 
oil sector, shut down of nuclear plants, establishment and privatization of local power plants, abolishment of energy price 
subsidies, improvement of energy efficiency in buildings and implementation of environmental regulation. 
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competition. I will treat the increase in power market concentration in more detail 
when Green and Grey pressure groups are discussed in section 4.2.4.1.  
 In 2000/2001 the German federal government reached an agreement50 with the 
energy sector to terminate the use of nuclear energy in Germany. Two nuclear plants 
were taken out of operation in 2002 and 2004 respectively. The next two nuclear 
power plants will be shut down in 2007 and 2008 (Diekmann and Kemfert 2006: 9). 
However, the nuclear phase-out will not accelerate before around 2010 (Michaelowa 
2003: 41). Studies showed that this phase-out would remove barriers and thus 
increase energy efficiency51. Some argued that the assumptions in these studies about 
the degree of energy efficiency increases seemed very optimistic (Michaelowa 2003: 
41). Summing up, it is unclear whether the energy efficiency potential has increased 
or decreased during the period under investigation.  
Decreasing fuel switch potential? 
It has been stated that the fuel switch potential was considerable in 2000: 36,8 % of 
energy and process CO2 emissions stemmed from coal, followed by oil and gas, gas 
only 17,5% (Ziesing 2006: 115). One could argue that there was potential here in 
switching from coal to gas similar to what happened in the UK52. Not only was coal 
the main fuel, it was heavily subsidised. In 2001 the country stood for about two-
thirds of the EU Member States aid to coal (two-thirds of 6319 million Ecu) (Eikeland 
2004: 14). If these subsidies were abolished53 Germany would save money. On the 
other hand, this could lead to jobs being lost in the coal industry where some 30.000 
were employed. Coal subsidies decreased only slightly in the period (ibid.).  
                                              
50
 The agreement was reached in 2000, signed in 2001 and the amended version entered into force in 2002 (Diekmann and 
Kemfert 2006: 9).  
51
 See, for instance, Fischedick et al. (2001) study for the BMU. Here it is concluded that the phase out would not 
jeopardize future emission targets.  
52
 The switch from coal to gas was a result of economic policy in the UK in the 1980s and early 1990s. Two of the main 
elements were a drastic slimming of the state administration and privatization of many sectors (Boehmer-Christiansen and 
Skea 1991:122).  
53
 EU has for a long time wanted a phase out of coal subsidies (Eikeland 2004:14).  
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If the liberalisation of the power and gas markets led to more competition, this would 
give an incentive for power companies to switch to a cheaper fuel. If gas was made 
cheaper as an effect of increasing competition, this could facilitate a shift from coal to 
gas. Similar to the case of the liberalisation of the power market, 1998 liberalisation 
of the gas market has not led to more competition and gas prices remain high 
(Diekmann and Kemfert 2006: 4). Another development in the period was the nuclear 
phase-out. Since new capacity would have to enter to substitute nuclear, the phasing 
out of nuclear would indirectly increase emissions from the electricity sector. A third 
development was the emerging renewables sector (BMU 2006b). Germany had an 
ambitious renewable energy target in this period, and the EEG act54 was a success and 
from 2002 there was an explosion of renewable energy firms (Interviews). This 
increased the potential for fuel switch. Summing up, the picture is not clear cut: there 
are developments which have served to increase the fuel-switch potential (i.e. 
renewables), while others (i.e. nuclear phase-out) may have decreased this. 
Switching from VAs to EU ETS – increase in national abatement costs? 
Scientific studies by different research institutions were published in 2003. One 
concluded that the EU ETS could lead to cost savings of many million euros since 
Germany would be a net seller of CO2 emission rights (Öko-institut et al. 2003: 147). 
Another pointed at the importance of having enough CO2 emission rights and that 
economic growth should not be restricted by a low cap (RWI 2003: 43). A third report 
concluded that ETS was more cost-efficient than VAs (Interview). Overall, it does not 
seem as though the national abatement costs were to increase with the change of 
instrument. Germany could earn from ETS, efficiency could be improved, although 
there were warnings that a low cap could harm growth.  
                                              
54
 A very effective but not cost-efficient policy has boosted renewable energy in Germany throughout the last decade. It 
started with investment subsidies and continued with guaranteed feed-in tariffs set out in energy feed in the law of 1991. 
Wind energy grew particularly rapidly. In 2002, Schleswig Holstein generated more than 50% of its electricity use from 
wind. In the amended EEG act all types of renewables received feed-in tariffs (Michaelowa 2003: 38). 
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Increasing vulnerability of the German economy? 
Has German economy’s vulnerability increased? Weak GDP and increasing 
unemployment are indicators of this. The tables 4-2 and 4-3 show GDP and 
unemployment developments in the period:  
Table 4-2 GDP developments 2000-2003 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
GDP + 3.1% + 0.6% + 0.2 % - 0.1 % 
  Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
 
Table 4-3 Unemployment developments1 2000-2003, absolute and relative numbers 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Unemployment 
(millions) 
3.25  3.11 3.25 3.7 
Unemployment 
rate (%)  
7.8% 7.4% 7.8% 8.7% 
1
 The total number of unemployed persons (European definition).The rate: the share  
   of unemployed persons in the total number of the economically active population. 
   Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
 
The GDP table shows that with the exception of the 2000 GDP figure, growth has 
been weak in this period. In 2003 the growth figure was negative. After unification 
(1991-2003) only 1993 showed a weaker growth than the years 2003, 2002 and 2001 
(Federal statistical office 2004, 2003, 2002). The second table shows that 
unemployment has risen in absolute and in relative numbers. The figure was slightly 
better in 2001, but the general trend in the period is increasing unemployment to 
around 3.7 million people in 2003. Summing up, the tables indicate that the 
economy’s vulnerability to costs has increased in the period. 
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Summing up: increasing abatement costs?  
Did abatement costs increase from 2000-2004? The picture is not clear and it is 
uncertain whether the energy efficiency potential and the fuel switch potential 
decreased or not. Studies pointed at a possible decrease in national abatement costs 
from a shift from VAs to ETS. However, one study argued that a strict cap would 
hamper economic growth. GDP showed weak figures and unemployment rose in the 
period. Given this, it is likely that the economy’s ability to handle abatement costs 
decreased in this period. Summing up, it seems as though there was no clear increase 
in abatement costs although costs in general may have become more problematic.  
4.2.2.2 Can increasing abatement costs explain decreasing climate 
ambitiousness? 
It is not clear if the abatement costs increased during the period, and consequentially 
rising abatement costs cannot explain the decreased climate ambitiousness. 
Nevertheless, the vulnerability of the German economy increased. Costs in general 
and also lost jobs were more problematic now than previously. The implementation of 
the 2000 climate program, reaching the 25% target, meant substantial costs. Given the 
rising unemployment, reducing employment in the coal industry as a consequence of 
ending subsidies, and stimulating a fuel switch, would seem less advantageous. 
Hence, it can be argued that not abatement costs per se but a German economy more 
vulnerable for costs can have played a role in the abandonment of the 25% target. It is 
however possible but not very likely that even if the economy was more vulnerable 
for costs this did not contribute to the abandonment of the target. It is possible that for 
instance the politicians chose to over-look this information. I will argue that for 
vulnerability to costs to be important it must have been given attention in the political 
process. When the factors are assessed overall in the end of this chapter consideration 
will be given to whether the increasing vulnerability of abatement costs was given 
attention by politicians – whether it strengthened Grey forces in the government or 
society, or whether it contributed to a learning and preference change.  
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In 2003, the discussion about the national allocation plan really started. Growth was 
especially weak in this year and unemployment was rising. However, could this make 
a difference in the 2 months in 2004 when the cap was increased? As far as I know 
the decision-makers did not gain new information as to the weakness of the economy 
in these two months but, as pointed out earlier, it might be that events during these 
two months acquired increased importance due to the increased vulnerability of the 
economy, or that these trends triggered costs concerns. This will be investigated in 
section 4.4.3 where an overall assessment is given of these factors. The nuclear phase-
out had to be integrated into the EU ETS allocation (Mattes and Schafhausen 2005: 
13-14). Thus, can this phase-out explain the cap-increase? The nuclear phase-out had 
already been taken into account in the NAP draft (Bals: 2004), hence concern over the 
nuclear phase out cannot explain the cap-increase from the draft to the final NAP.  
4.2.3  Power relationship: Green and Grey forces in government 
The main assumption of the influence of this factor is:  
P3: The Green forces in government may have been relatively weakened, for instance 
may the Green forces have been weakened due to weak election results. These 
changes may contribute to explain decreasing German climate ambitiousness. 
This section commences by discussing whether Green forces in government have 
become relatively weakened. Then, it is discussed whether a relatively weakening of 
Green forces can explain the decrease in climate ambitiousness.  
4.2.3.1  Have the Green forces in government become relatively 
weakened? 
This section commences by showing possible changes in the relative strength of 
Green political parties. Then possible changes in the relative strength of the Ministry 
of Environment will be discussed.  
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Have the Green party and the government as such become weakened? 
There was a federal election in 2002. The Red-Green coalition stayed in power and 
the Greens won their largest number of votes at the federal election since they were 
founded. This made it the third largest political party in Germany. SPD lost votes, but 
fewer than estimated some weeks earlier (Jung and Roth 2002: 9). Thus, in the second 
Red-Green coalition the Green party was somewhat strengthened vis à vis the SPD. 
The Green party is known as more environmentally friendly than the SPD. Thus one 
could claim that this meant a strengthening of the Green forces in government.  
However, the 2002 federal election results also show that SPD lost more votes than 
the Greens gained; thus, overall the government was weakened (against the 
opposition) (ibid.). Moreover, in the second chamber (Bundesrat) the opposition 
parties had the majority and may have weakened the capacity of the government to 
follow up on policies for instance with regard to climate policy. This may have led to 
a weakening of the Green forces in this period.  
Has BMU become relatively weakened? 
This section examines whether the BMUs competences and possibility to intervene 
has decreased, whether the BMU minister has weakened, and if the BMUs 
institutional capacity has decreased. 
Has BMU competences and possibility to intervene decreased? 
What was the situation like in 2000 in regard to BMUs powers and possibility to 
intervene in climate policy? The BMU formulated climate targets and the other 
ministries followed up targets with measures. This organisational distinction was seen 
as problematic (Böckem 2000: 4). Earlier, to improve the situation the inter-
ministerial working group (IMA) on CO2 reduction was established55 and BMU was 
                                              
55
 13 June 1990, the federal government established “CO2 reduction” inter-ministerial working group, which is charged 
with identifying the potential for GHG reductions, especially CO2. In the framework of IMA and under the chairmanship of 
BMU, working parties were established for the following topics: energy supply, transport, buildings and structures, new 
technologies, agriculture and forestry (BMU 2002b: 1).  
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to lead the horizontal coordination of the more influential pollution ministries 
(Jänicke et al. 2006: 18). This functioned only when substantial interests of other 
sectors were not affected (Böckem 2000: 5). Michaelowa (2003: 34) argues that 
stalemates and block action have been frequent. Some give the IMA a more positive 
assessment arguing that even if the influence of the BMU is limited, the other 
ministries are forced to justify their policies (Böckem 2000: 6). Summing up, in 2000, 
the institutional preconditions for BMU influence on climate policy were quite weak.  
Have there been any changes in BMUs powers and possibilities to intervene in the 
period under investigation? BMUs role has changed from being mainly a coordinator 
in 2000, to an initiative-taker in developing climate policies and measures. One of the 
developments that caused this change was the Chancellor’s decision to set up another 
IMA sub-group on emission inventory in addition to the five existing measures. This 
sub-group was chaired by the BMU (Mez and Watanabe 2004: 112-113). Another 
development was that BMU gained the responsibility for renewable energies in 2002 
(Mez and Watanabe 2004: 121). Thus, BMU has gained responsibility for instruments 
in this policy area. A third development was the 2001 sustainable development 
strategy which introduced a more vertical integration of environmental concern 
(Jänicke et al. 2006: 18). A reflection of this change is that the BMU has gone from 
being a controller to partner in regard to the implementation of decisions from super 
ordinate organs (ibid.). Summing up; BMU is still dependent on other ministries on 
policy instruments. However, developments in this period have lead to a growth in 
BMUs powers and strengthened its possibility to intervene.  
Has the BMU minister become relatively weakened?  
Due to the increase in BMUs powers and possibilities to intervene, it can be argued 
that the BMU ministerial position in the government has been strengthened. Is the 
BMU minister viewed as stronger? If one is to compare the political clout of the 
BMU and BMWA ministers in this period, Trittin and Clement, they were both 
viewed as strong ministers. Clement was “super-minister”, minister for both economy 
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and employment, having a very strong position in government (Interviews). However, 
in this period the Hartz 4 labour reform56 was introduced, and it has been argued that 
this occupied most of his time. In many peoples’ eyes he also failed on this and 
became weaker in government towards the end of the period (ibid.). Trittin was 
viewed as strong throughout the whole period (ibid.) and it could be claimed that the 
Green forces were relatively strengthened. Nevertheless, some maintained that 
Trittin’s largest accomplishments were during the SPD/Green coalitions first term in 
office from 1998-2002 (ENDS Daily 2005) 57.  
Has the BMUs institutional capacity decreased? 
Has the institutional capacity of the BMU decreased in the period? Table 4-4 presents 
development of the BMU and BMWI budget since 199858.  
Table 4-4 BMU and BMWA budget developments, in 1000 euro 
Ministry Budget 98 Budget 03  Budget 04 
BMWA 16 145 737 30 508 193 32 951 325 
BMU   1 212 408      794 022      789 414 
Source: Bundeshaushaltsplan 1998, 2004 
During the entire period under investigation the BMWA budget has been considerably 
larger than that of the BMU. Moreover, the budget of the BMWA has grown quite 
considerably while that of the BMU has been reduced. Have there been developments 
as to the number of employees in these two ministries? In 1998 Ministry of 
Economics had 1718 employees as against 740 in the Ministry of Environment 
                                              
56
 In 2002/2003 Germany began to tackle some of the rigidities of its labor market with the Hartz and Agenda 2010 reforms 
(Ardy and Umbach 2004: 17). These reforms seem to be driven by German domestic considerations, notably the need by 
the government to be doing something about the employment problem (ibid.: 22).  
57
 During this period an energy tax programme was launched, nuclear electricity generators were forced to agree to phase 
out their reactors and generous feed-in subsidies for renewables were introduced. 
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(Bundeshaushaltsplan 1998). Unfortunately, I do not have data showing the 
development in employees. However, Jänicke argues in 2006 that BMU frequently 
had insufficient personnel so that it cannot be an appropriate counterweight in the 
inter-ministerial tuning (Jänicke et al. 2006: 20). Thus, it seems as through the BMU 
has fewer personnel resources than BMWA, but it is hard to assess if the difference 
has been increasing or decreasing. Developments in the budget and number of 
employees have to be seen in association with developments in tasks. Have there been 
changes in the tasks of the different ministries in this period? In 2002, the BMU 
gained the responsibility for renewable energies and a sub-group under the IMA. In 
2002, there was also a reorganisation of the ministries in Germany and two ministries 
became one BMWA, the Ministry of Economy and Labour. One of the main tasks for 
this ministry was to implement a major reform, the Hatz 4 reform, whereby, a large 
proportion of the BMWA budget increase (especially from 1998-2003) can be 
explained by this. Summing up, looking at budgets and employees BMUs institutional 
capacity has decreased, although the Hartz 4 reform absorbed many resources. Hence, 
there was no clear relative weakening in the BMU’s institutional capacity in this 
period.  
Summing up on the relative strength of the BMU 
BMU’s relative strength has not decreased but increased, in fact, during the period: 
the BMU’s power and possibility to intervene has increased and the BMU minister 
has been viewed as relatively strengthened vis à vis the BMWA minister. There have 
been no big changes in regard to BMUs institutional capacity in the period.  
Summing up: Have the Green forces in government become relatively weaker?  
The Green party was strengthened vis à vis the SPD after the 2002 federal election. 
However, the coalition in total was a little weakened. The BMU has become relatively 
                                                                                                                                           
58
 It can be argued that changes in budgets and numbers of employees only leads to changes in policy strength if it leads to 
more/less activity/reports, more/less knowledge etc. However, unfortunately I have not been able to find data on this.  
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strengthened. Overall it seems as though the Green forces have been strengthened in 
this period.  
4.2.3.2 Can a relative weakening of Green forces in government 
explain decreasing climate ambitiousness? 
Overall, the Green forces were strengthened in this period, so this cannot explain the 
decrease in climate ambitiousness: abandoning the 25% target or the cap-increase. 
Mez and Watanabe (2004: 121-122) have argued that with the Greens gain of 
negotiating power in the coalition government they succeeded in strengthening 
environmental policies in the new coalition agreement which included a long term 
target of reducing GHG by 40% by 2020.  
Given the strengthening of the Greens and the weakening of Clement due to “failure” 
with the Hartz 4 reform, and the fact that the cap was Trittins table the ultimate cap-
increase is somewhat strange. In the period BMU has also gone from being mainly a 
controller, to a partner of the ministries responsible for polluting activities in regard to 
the implementation of decisions from super ordinate organs. However, that this 
change has its limits was shown in the conflict over the cap.  
The BMU minister, Trittin, stood against the BMWA minister, Clement and the 
climate between the two ministries was hostile and tense (Interviews). The state 
secretary of the BMU and of BMWA agreed on a compromise; however, Clement 
refused to accept the compromise of his own state secretary (Point Carbon 2004a). In 
the end, a compromise was reached on 30. March, the day before the final deadline 
for submitting the NAP to the commission. Chancellor Schröder was involved in 
reaching this compromise and which was mostly directed towards the BMWA (ENDS 
Daily 2004). How can this be explained?  
It has been argued that part of the reason why the ministers agreed on this more 
BMWA-friendly compromise was that there was a horse-trade cap for the renewable 
energies act (Interviews). The renewable energies act was amended the same week as 
 75 
the decision on the cap was taken. Moreover, BMU had gained responsibility for 
renewable energies, but they needed agreement with the BMWA. But why did it have 
to come to a last minute horse-trade, given a stronger BMU and Green party? This 
question will be addressed in the section 4.4.3 where the interplay of factors is 
discussed. 
4.2.4 Power balance between Green and Grey societal pressure 
groups 
Let us repeat the proposition on Green and Grey societal groups and their influence 
on German climate ambitiousness: 
P4: Green societal pressure groups may have been relatively weakened. For instance, 
may Grey pressure groups concentrations have increased strengthening their lobby 
power. These changes may contribute to explain decreasing German climate 
ambitiousness. 
The first section discusses Green pressure groups and whether they have been 
relatively weakened in this period. The second section discussed whether changes in 
the relative strength of the Green forces can contribute to explain the decrease in 
climate ambitiousness. 
4.2.4.1 Have Green forces become relatively weaker? 
First, aspects relevant for Green and Grey forces mobilisation will be discussed prior 
to a consideration of any relative weakening of Green pressure groups in this period.  
Have there been changes in preconditions for societal pressure groups 
mobilisation?  
For Green forces to mobilise, visibility is central. If the problem activity in question 
stems from point sources that are easy to identify and visible, ENGOs are mobilised 
as a counter balancing force to target groups. Both the VAs and emissions trading 
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instrument, target visible point sources. Hence, there has been no change in regard to 
Green forces reasons of mobilisation.  
For Grey forces to mobilise, distribution of costs is central. Climate policy 
instruments could spread costs on many sectors. It can be argued that the 2000 climate 
programme had a policy mix that was diffuse with costs spread over many sectors. 
Moreover, VAs was the main instrument in the policy combination. In the VAs there 
were no explicit sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and costly emission 
reductions were optional.  
The emissions trading instrument was to become the most important policy 
instrument. Similar to the VAs it targeted mainly the energy and industry sector, but it 
was binding and costs became clearer. However, caps also had to be set for other 
sectors. Hence, it was possible to give the emission trading sector a high cap and push 
costs over to other sectors. Moreover, the energy and industry sector is essential for 
the German economy; the companies under the industry associations have market 
power and can threaten with job losses. Hence, the instrument hit the social centre. If 
it is likely that costs will be concentrated, this could trigger mobilisation and pressure 
against the policy. Since this sector is central for the German economy it is more 
likely that decision-makers will yield to pressure.  
Organisation degree/concentration: Relatively weaker Green pressure groups? 
Böckem argued in 2000 that industry associations and unions influence German 
climate policy much more than ENGOs and the renewables industry (Böckem 
2000:8). One of the main reasons was that the Green side was more fragmented than 
the polluting industries (ibid.: 9). Moreover, the companies under the industry 
associations had market power and could threaten to cut jobs (ibid.: 9).  
In the period under investigation the renewable energy sector has grown in Germany. 
Especially since 2002, this sector has exploded. Several associations have been built – 
solar, wind, biogas etc. (Interview). Many have argued that the renewables sector 
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have become more powerful, but at the same time the industry is still fragmented and 
does not have a strong unified lobby (Interviews). Even if the renewables industry has 
grown, the fact that they were still fragmented could make it hard for them to target a 
centralised climate policy decision process. As mentioned earlier, concentration of 
power generators has increased in Germany. When liberalisation started in 1998 there 
were 8 companies which were protected by area-monopoly, but following 
liberalisation, the power companies merged into four at the federal level (and 40 at 
the regional level). The four largest companies cover about 80% of the country’s 
electricity production (BMWA 2003, 11 ff). Of these four two dominate: E.ON and 
RWE. The competition has decreased in Germany and the power market has become 
an oligopoly (Monopoly commission 2004). E.ON and RWE are under investigation 
for market power misuse (Interview). Several of the interviewees argued that this 
concentration in the energy sector has increased the lobby power of the power 
industry (Interviews). Thus, it appears as though liberalisation contributed to an 
increase in concentration, but how was this possible? This will be assessed in the 
section 4.4 when the interplay of factors is looked into.  
Access to committees: relatively weaker Green pressure groups? 
The inter-ministerial working group, AG Emissionshandel (AGE) was established on 
18. October 2000 to investigate the emissions trading instruments and to follow the 
discussion about this at the EU level (AGE 2002). From the beginning and throughout 
the period under investigation three ENGOs have had a seat in AGE; Germanwatch, 
WWF and BUND. However, the majority of stakeholder groups present were 
companies in the energy and industry sector. Both ENGOs and industry described 
AGE as a “polite talking circle”. Some argued that it was basically to keep people 
quiet. Others pointed at it as a pleasant way of acquiring knowledge (Interviews). 
There was no change in the power relationship between Green and Grey pressure 
groups in regard to who was invited to sit in this group (ibid.). If there is no 
agreement at the working level, the discussion is taken to the level of the Chancellor. 
This is a small circle and there is no tradition for inviting in ENGOs although the big 
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power companies all belong to this circle (ibid.). There were no changes in who was 
invited into this circle in this period (ibid.).  
In summary, there was no change in Green forces formal access possibilities in the 
period.  
Informal access pattern: relatively weaker Green pressure groups?  
It was argued in 2000 that industry associations had the best channels for influence. 
Industry associations had contacts to BMWA which was in charge of policy 
instruments (Böckem 2000: 10). Moreover, they had close links with politicians, for 
instance the energy companies had close links to the SPD (ibid.: 11). The ENGOs had 
good contacts to the BMU which was only in charge of target-setting (ibid.: 10).  
Have there been changes in Green forces informal access to German decision-makers 
in the period? There are still close contacts between ENGOs and BMU officers 
(Interviews). The BMU contact is of more importance given the increasing strength of 
the BMU in this period. Many have also argued that BMU is a knowledgeable actor, 
and that it in the emissions trading case had better knowledge than that of the BMWA 
(ibid.). Moreover, the ENGOs views are taken more into account when the Green 
party is in government. This is because the Green party has more understanding for 
civil society, the SPD mainly represents “the little worker” (Interview). The 
strengthening of the Green party after the 2002 election made the Green party a more 
important contact. Moreover, in the period the industry had good contacts with the 
BMWA. There are close links between the ministry and the power companies (ibid.). 
Industry does not have good contacts with the BMU and lack of trust from both 
parties is said to be the reason for this. In addition, the power companies and the coal 
industry also had good contacts with SPD, and Chancellor Schröder was known for 
opening the doors to the big power companies (ibid.). 
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Summing up, it appears as though there were no changes in informal access patterns, 
although the importance of the ENGOs channels appeared to have increased since 
both the Green party and the BMU gained strength in this period.  
Summing up: relative weakening of Green societal pressure groups? 
Have Green societal pressure groups become relatively weakened in the period? The 
picture is not entirely clear. Power companies’ concentration increased in the period 
and there has been no change in regard to Green groups’ access at the level of the 
chancellor in this period: Green groups are still not invited in. However, the 
strengthening of the BMU and the Green party has given the Green forces stronger 
contacts.  
4.2.4.2 Can relative weakening of Green societal pressure groups 
explain decreasing climate ambitiousness? 
Can relative weakening of Green societal pressure groups explain decreasing climate 
ambitiousness? The Green societal pressure groups gained stronger channels of 
influence, although, as has been pointed out in section 4.2.3.2, the strengthening of 
the Green party and the BMU cannot explain the decrease in climate ambitiousness. 
Another change in regard to the power balance between Green and Grey societal 
pressure groups took place in this period – the concentration in the power market 
increased. Can this development contribute to explain the decision on leaving the 
25% target? The emissions in the energy sector were rising. In order to reach the 25% 
target, large emission reductions would have to take place in the energy sector. If this 
were to take place, the power sector would probably lobby strongly against it. It is 
reasonable to believe that concentration in the energy sector and these actors good 
contacts with leading politicians and the main party in government SPD, contributed 
to Germany abandoning this target and focusing on the 21% target instead.  
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Can the increasing concentration in the power market contribute to explain the cap-
increase? The cap in the drafted NAP was in line with the VAs (Matthes and 
Schafhausen forthcoming: 13). This was a target that BDI and the BMWA had 
accepted (Zöckler 2004: 52). The big environmental organisation, BUND, argued that 
this cap was almost acceptable even if it meant a less ambitious target than the 25% 
target of the 2000 climate programme (BUND 2004).  
The emissions trading instrument was to hit the energy and industry sector. However, 
binding targets would also have to be set for the other sectors so they were also hit. 
Did this lead to energy and industry sector mobilisation? Faced with the possibility of 
concentration of costs, the power companies mobilised. It appears as though lobbying 
by the industry was one important reason for the cap-increase (Wettestad and 
Sæverud 2005: 19). The state secretary of BMU tried to use the different interests of 
the various industrial branches, but it did not work: industry managed to have one 
common front in the cap issue (Interview). The split that later came between energy-
intensive companies and the power companies was at that time not that big and both 
wanted a high cap: if the emission-cake were big enough there would be no losers 
(ibid.).  
The renewables industry could benefit from a strict cap but had no clear strong voice 
in the debate, the reason being that it was still an emerging and fragmented sector 
(Interviews).The BMWA and BDI started to argue that the cap was too low and that 
they wanted growth reserves and full allocation (Bals: 2004). In February 2004, it was 
reported that meetings were abandoned or boycotted by industry and that the situation 
was generally unpleasant. It was also reported that many interest groups tried to affect 
the system (Point Carbon 2004b).  
As the decision-makers did not manage to agree at the working level, the discussion 
was taken to the level of the chancellor, where the four big power companies but no 
ENGOs were present (Interviews). ENGOs wanted Trittin to make the cap a question 
of coalition. But he did not do this. One of the reasons for this was that the ETS was 
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complicated to understand and had little support in society (ibid.). March 2004 the 
BDI president expressed his satisfaction with the BMWA minister Clement because 
burdens on the industry had been avoided (ENDS Daily 2004). Thus, it seems like the 
industry lobby must have worked.  
However, the ENGOs also mobilised (Interviews), and the BMU and the Greens had 
been strengthened in the period. It is therefore interesting to ask: why the German 
decision-makers gave in to industry pressure in the cap case? Is the increased 
concentration and thus enhanced lobby power, the full explanation of why this 
happened, or were there also other elements that made industry’s successes possible? 
This question will be discussed in section 4.4.3 when the interplay of factors is 
discussed.  
4.3 External Factors 
This section discusses the influence of the two external factors presented in Chapter 
2. Firstly, changes in EU climate/energy policy will be assessed. Secondly, German 
decision-makers learning from climate performance of other EU-15 countries will be 
discussed.  
4.3.1  Changes in EU climate/energy policy 
Let us recapitulate the proposition on EU policy influence on German climate 
ambitiousness: 
P5: Changes in EU climate/energy policy may have taken place. For instance may the 
EU ETS directive have established high caps for Member States. These changes may 
contribute to explaining decreasing German climate ambitiousness. 
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This section starts out by describing changes in EU climate policy, and to some 
extent, energy policy. Thereafter, changes in EU climate/energy policy will be 
discussed and whether these can explain decreasing German climate ambitiousness. 
4.3.1.1 Changes in EU climate/energy policy that might impact on 
German climate targets? 
Have there been any changes in EU policy on climate ambitiousness? It can be argued 
that there were no changes in EU policy on emission targets. Firstly, no new burden-
sharing arrangement was adopted in this period. However, in 2000, the BSA became 
legally binding for every EU country independent of signing the Kyoto protocol. The 
EU’s ratification of the Kyoto protocol in 2002 was a further statement of the BSA 
targets. Secondly, no country-specific caps were set in the EU Directive establishing 
the EU emissions trading scheme. However, in Annex III to the Directive it is stated 
that the total quantity shall not exceed what is needed, and shall be consistent with a 
path towards achieving or over-achieving the (BSA) Kyoto target (European 
Commission 2003: Annex III). The EU commission also expressed that the first phase 
2005-2007 of the emissions trading scheme was a pilot phase. At the same time, there 
were clear prescriptions for certain ambitiousness in the cap-setting (Wettestad and 
Sæverud 2005: 5). The EU published a NAP guidance to assist Member States in the 
interpretation of the Directive. Here it is stated that the path towards Kyoto does not 
need to be a straight line (European Commission 2004: Article 12). This indicates 
Member States may set less ambitious caps for the period 2005-7 if the caps set for 
the second period, the Kyoto period, are more ambitious.  
It was argued in Chapter 2 that EU policy changes may influence national policies 
through influencing domestic politics. Two such indirect impacts were mentioned. 
Firstly, as described in Chapter 3, the introduction of emissions trading in Germany 
meant a strengthening of the climate policy instrument combination. Compared to the 
VAs the ETS was legally binding, slightly stronger in regard to specificity and scope, 
and it had stronger compliance mechanisms. Hence, compared to the VAs, ETS made 
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the costs clearer with its absolute caps. Moreover, it made costs more certain due to 
its transparency and due to strict compliance mechanisms such as financial penalties. 
For more details on what the change of main instrument meant in terms of policy 
instrument strength see Chapter 3.  
Another factor that could have had an indirect impact on German climate 
ambitiousness was the EU led liberalisation of the power market. It has been argued 
that the EU electricity directive basically offered a framework for further 
liberalisation of the electricity sector with considerable freedom for Member States to 
choose their own pace and regulatory measures (Eikeland 2004: 6). For instance, the 
Member States should opt for a system of regulated third party access but should not 
be derived the opportunity to apply a system of negotiated access (ibid.). The intent 
behind the directive was that the liberalisation should lead to more competition. This 
process could affect the energy efficiency potential; this has been assessed in section 
4.2.2.1 on abatement costs. However, another effect of increased competition could 
also be a decline in power industry’s market power. This could again weaken power 
industry politically in terms of lobbing power towards the state. As mentioned earlier, 
the liberalisation did not increase competition in Germany. In the period under 
investigation the power companies merged, and the concentration in the power sector 
was enhanced.  
Summing up, there was no new EU policy on climate ambitiousness. However, the 
EU ETS, being a stronger instrument than the VAs and the effects of the liberalisation 
of the power market, may have changed the preconditions for domestic climate 
politics.  
4.3.1.2 Can changes in EU climate/energy policy explain decreasing 
climate ambitiousness? 
Can new EU climate/energy policy explain decreasing German climate 
ambitiousness? First, can it explain the decision on abandoning the 25% target? No 
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new EU BSA came, thus this cannot explain why the target was abandoned. It was 
also mentioned in the EU ETS directive and the NAP Guidance that the cap was to 
show a path towards achieving or over-achieving the BSA-target (my italics). Hence, 
over-achieving the 21% target was possible in the cap-setting. Should one then 
conclude that EU climate policy cannot explain why the 25% target was abandoned?  
At least one could argue that abandoning the 25% target was not an intended effect of 
EU policy on climate targets. However, it can be argued that it was an unintended 
effect. Several of the interviewees indicated reasons why the 25% target was 
abandoned. One interviewee stated that: “Remember these [25% target, target for 
renewables] are political targets (…) otherwise we have a real commitment, the EU 
burden-sharing” (Interview). Another interviewee claimed that “this [BSA target] is 
still the target independent of governments” (ibid.). Moreover, many pointed out that 
the BSA target was ambitious among the EU-15 countries (ibid.). Furthermore, in the 
FAQs to the climate program, the BMU answers the question on why the 25% target 
was abandoned. Here it is argued that since the BSA target became legally binding, 
this has been the target for Germany (BMU 2005a: 3). Moreover, it is stated that the 
25% target was used to attain the goal of other countries committing themselves to 
stronger targets (ibid.).  
How can these statements be interpreted? There are some strange things said here, for 
instance that the BSA target was the real target because it was independent of 
governments. This is a strange statement because this target was made by the 
Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) and the Liberal Party (FDP) government in 
1990 and all governments after this have confirmed this target59. This should have 
strengthened its position, and given it a higher status than just being a political target. 
The BMU statement is also somewhat strange: if the target was abandoned as early as 
in 2000, why was it confirmed in the 2002 coalition declaration and the 2002 
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 The CDU/CSU/SPD government of 2005 was the first government not to confirm this target (Federal Government 2005). 
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communication to the UNFCCC? Moreover, if the function of this target was to 
influence other countries to set more ambitious targets; why was this function not 
important after 2000? Were there set more ambitious targets in the EU-15 after this? 
As far as I know, this was not the case. How could these statements then be 
interpreted?  
A common view among the interviewees was that the 21% target was the real target; 
that it was internationally binding. It can be argued that when the EU made the BSA 
legally binding, the status of the German BSA target increased, and that this was used 
to legitimise abandoning the 25% target. Hence, an EU policy change i.e. making the 
BSA legally binding, had the unintended effect in Germany that it legitimised a move 
away from the more ambitious domestic target. This was an unintended effect since 
the EU stated that an over-achievement of the BSA target was fine.  
To the question of why the government decided to abandon the 25% target, one 
interviewee argued that it was strange that the Greens when along on this (Interview). 
It can be argued that it is somewhat strange that the BMU and the Green party went 
along with using the BSA to legitimise abandoning the 25% target. Why this 
happened will be discussed in section 4.4.2, when the interplay of factors is taken up. 
Can the developments in EU policy explain the cap-increase? In the period under 
investigation the EU ETS directive was adopted. The EU emissions trading directive 
did not contain country-specific caps, so this cannot explain the cap-setting in 
Germany. Can one conclude then that this directive did not impact on the German 
cap-setting? I will argue “no”. The vague formulation in the Directive in regard to 
ambitiousness and the emphasis on the period 2005-7 as a pilot phase gave room for 
flexibility. Moreover, it made “gaming” between and within Member States possible. 
Member states and analysts expected less ambitious caps in this first period. For 
instance, Schleich et al. (2004: 114) argue that one thought at that time that policy 
makers would probably choose rather soft targets to get the system “off the ground” 
rather than face stiff opposition from industry lobby groups. This will be discussed 
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more in detail in section 4.3.2 when the next factor is assessed; learning from the 
climate performance of other EU countries. 
The ETS directive may also have had another impact on cap-setting. The EU ETS 
directive was to establish a strong instrument. It was binding and slightly more 
transparent. It can also be argued that the cap made the costs clearer. Some of the 
interviewees pointed out that “emissions trading made the costs visible”, and “CO2 
got a price”. The costs in case of non-compliance became more certain due to 
enhanced transparency, thus non-compliance would be more easily detected and when 
detected, non-compliant companies would have to suffer financial penalties. Many 
interviewees pointed out that now it became serious. This was something that could 
trigger industry mobilisation. As has been pointed out earlier, industry mobilisation 
was one of the important factors explaining the cap-increase. The potential indirect 
impacts of the ETS Directive and the liberalisation of the power market will be 
assessed in section 4.4 when the factors are discussed jointly. 
4.3.2 Learning from climate performance of other EU countries 
Let us repeat the last proposition: 
P6: Learning from the climate performance of other EU countries may have taken 
place. German decision-makers may have learnt that EU Member States do little for 
climate protection and decided that it should also not do much on this. This learning 
and preference change may contribute to explain decreasing German climate 
ambitiousness.  
This section starts out describing changes in the climate performance of EU-15 
countries and how these changes have been interpreted in Germany. Then, whether 
preference changes may explain decreasing German climate ambitiousness i.e. 
abandoning the 25% target and the cap-increase is discussed. 
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4.3.2.1 Learning from worsening climate performance of EU-15 
countries? 
The following figure illustrates the distance between the BSA commitment and 
projected60GHG emissions in 2010 for the EU-15 countries. 
 
Figure 4-1 Gap between BSA commitments and projected GHG emissions in 2010  
Source: EEA 2002  
The figure shows that only Germany, UK and Sweden were on track to reach their 
Kyoto commitments with the measures already in place. Instead of reductions, it 
appears as though several Member States will increased their emissions considerably. 
Did the weak GHG reduction trends of the EU-15 countries lead to German decision-
makers learning that others do little and they also would not have to do much? 
Germany has constantly proclaimed that it is and wants to be a climate policy leader 
(see for instance BMU 2002a, Bang et al. 2004: 11). The thought is that if Germany 
shows a good example, the others EU countries will follow. As one interviewee 
commented: “What others do is not that relevant since Germany thinks the others will 
follow” (Interview). Germany’s leader role has also met growing resistance from 
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 Projections with existing policies and measures. Negative figures represent over-delivery, while positive figures represent 
shortfall from emission target.  
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central German actors and from Germany industry, and many have asked how long 
Germany will have to lead before the others follow suit (Interviews). Moreover, many 
have expressed concern about the situation for German industry if Germany is going 
to be a leader alone (BUND 2004, Interviews). Some interviewees mentioned that the 
BMU does not listen to industry’s concern (Interviews). Could it be concluded that 
there has been no preference change in this period? The BMU has argued that 
Germany can be a leader, but there will be no going alone (see for instance BMU 
2005a). Moreover, German decision-makers have stressed that the other EU countries 
should not leave their commitments and many have expressed concern over this 
development (Interviews).  
What was the cap status of other EU Member states? A few Member States, the UK 
for example, had national emission reduction targets which were more ambitious than 
their BSA commitment (Mullins and Karas 2003: 6)61. By the end of 2003 it had not 
been determined whether the UK would take the more ambitious national target as 
point of departure in the cap-setting. The national target was well established in UK 
policy (ibid.: 58). Moreover, there were clear signals that most Member States would 
not set strict caps (ibid.: 29). The UK cap was increased at the time of the German 
cap-increase (Interview, Matthes and Schafhausen forthcoming: 6).  
Summing up on learning from other Member states actions  
Had German decision-makers learned that since other EU countries do little in regard 
to climate policy, Germany would not have to do much either? In 2003 a GHG 
reduction figure showed that while Germany was on track to reach its BSA target, 
most EU-15 countries would have problems reaching theirs. Moreover, there were 
signals that EU countries would decide on high caps. The interviewees argued that 
what other EU countries do is not that relevant for Germany, since Germany wants to 
be a climate policy leader. Hence, one could conclude that the answer to the question 
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 UK has a national target of 20% CO2 emission reduction by 2010 (Mullins and Karas 2003: 56).  
 89 
is “no”. But there is some evidence pointing in the opposite direction. There was a 
slight change in the BMUs emphasis: from leader to increasing emphasis that there 
would be no going alone. Hence, I would argue that learning took place in the period 
and could have contributed to a slight preference change. 
4.3.2.2 Can decision-makers learning from unambitious climate 
performance of other Member States explain decreasing 
climate ambitiousness? 
Can this slight preference change due to learning that others do little explain why the 
25% target was abandoned? I would maintain that it is plausible that such a 
preference change played a role when this target was abandoned. The German BSA 
target was one of the most ambitious in terms of CO2 reduction. Sticking to the 21% 
target would keep Germany among the countries with the most ambitious targets. 
Following the 25% target would mean going alone. Hence, I believe that this 
preference change can shed light on the decision to abandon the 25% target in favour 
of the 21% target. It is however, difficult to say how important this was.  
Can this learning and slight preference change explain the cap-increase? Matthes and 
Schafhausen (forthcoming: 6) claim that announcements of the developments of 
NAPs in the EU Member States played a fundamental role in the process, above all 
developments in UK. Moreover, policy by rumours was an important and really 
problematic facet of the political discussion in Germany (ibid.: 33-34). As mentioned 
above, the UK cap was increased. Given the statement of Matthes and Schafhausen 
above it is likely that these cap-signals were important for the German decision to 
increase the cap.  
This slight preference change whereby Germany not want to reduce targets alone, 
may explain why these cap-signals were important. If such a preference change had 
not taken place, why should Germany care about other countries cap-setting and cap-
increase? Then the country could set ambitious caps for the first period of the ETS 
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and maybe this would encourage the other Member States to set higher caps for the 
ETS second period: the important Kyoto period.  
In a parliamentary speech 12 March 2004 on the TEHG, the law transposing the EU 
ETS directive into German law, a SPD representative pointed to the fact that 
Germany had been a front-runner on climate policy instruments such as the EEG and 
the eco-tax and that other EU countries had followed after very long time, and that 
some had not followed. Moreover, he argued that it was positive that the EU ETS was 
introduced in all Member States at the same time, since it made harmonisation 
possible (Deutscher Bundestag 2004: 8801). In my opinion, this shows how the 
preference for not going alone manifested itself in the desire for a harmonised EU 
emissions trading instrument. One interviewee argued that everybody took UK as a 
benchmark. Moreover, the interviewee stated: “I think that is sensible (…) Europe as 
a whole has a commitment (…) and the EU Commission is the one judging the NAPs 
and it will do it in the light with all.” This statement also confirms the interpretation 
that the BSA was the target and that it was also natural in the cap-setting for Germany 
to follow the trend of other countries. Hence, it can be claimed that this preference 
change and the consequential desire for a harmonised approach can explain why the 
UK cap-increase and rumours about other Member States deciding on high caps 
contributed to the German decision of increasing the cap.  
Summing up, learning from other EU members states climate performance has taken 
place, from leader to leader but no going alone. This slight preference change can 
contribute in explaining why the ambitious national target was left and why the cap 
was increased. But why did it come to this preference change? Was it only due to 
Germany seeing that EU countries did little, or was it also other factors that 
contributed to this preference change? I will return to this when the factors are 
assessed jointly in the next section. 
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4.4  Assessing the Factors Together 
4.4.1 Summing up on the separate analysis: Many questions 
In the separate analysis of each explanatory factors influence on climate 
ambitiousness, many questions arose. These are repeated below. 
In regard to the first factor, it seems as though learning from domestic experience in 
the period has been that an ambitious climate policy is politically difficult to achieve. 
But why have German decision-makers learnt this? 
 In regard to abatement cost, the following questions arose: Was the increased 
vulnerability of German economy focused by decision-makers; did it strengthen the 
Grey forces, or did it contributed to preference change and learning among decision-
makers? In regard to the cap-increase, no studies came out during these two months 
although it was possible that other events during this brief period may have triggered 
a potentially increased concern for costs. Did this happen?  
In regard to the third factor, it was found that Green pressure groups were relatively 
weakened as a consequence of the increased concentration on the power market, and 
that this could contribute to explain why the 25% target was abandoned, and further, 
that industry mobilisation was an important factor in the cap-increase. What can 
explain the power sector concentration? Can factors other than increased 
concentration explain why industry’s views were taken more into account?  
EU policy developments have not influenced on German climate ambitiousness 
directly, or at least not directly by intent (EU making the BSA legally binding was 
used to legitimise the abandoning of the 25% target). However, the ETS directive was 
vague on climate ambitiousness and it made the costs visible, has this lead to industry 
mobilisation and “gaming” between countries?  
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The factor “learning from climate performance of other EU countries” was found to 
be important in explaining the decrease in climate ambitiousness. There was a 
German desire for no longer reducing emissions alone. However, can other elements 
have contributed to this desire of not going alone? 
The sections below seek to explain the relationship of the explanatory factors, thereby 
shedding some light on the questions above. The first section investigates the 
interplay of factors in the decision on leaving the 25% target. The second section 
assesses the interplay in the case with the cap-increase.  
4.4.2 Assessing the interplay of factors: the abandonment of the 
25% target 
It is plausible that the increasing vulnerability of German economy, the weak GDP 
figures and the rising unemployment, lead to a strengthening of the industries’ 
arguments: the argument that “if you do this we will have to cut another 40,000 jobs” 
was even more threatening now that before (Interview). It was suggested that the 25% 
target meant substantial costs and that it most likely would require a restructuring of 
the energy sector. This could lead to job losses in coal sector for instance. Given that 
SPD was the “defender of the workers”, such a restructuring would be political 
problematic. This may explain why German decision-makers learned that ambitious 
climate policy was hard to achieve.  
German decision-makers also saw that other EU countries did little to achieve 
emissions reduction, and learned that even if Germany was leading, the others were 
lagging behind. Hence, German decision-makers did not want Germany to go alone. 
The increased vulnerability of German economy also contributed to this preference 
change: if Germany was to go on leading alone, this would harm Germany economy 
and competitiveness of German industry. Many voices argued that industry’s 
competitiveness was threatened by ambitious targets.  
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It has already been pointed at how one change in EU policy impacted on the decision 
to leave the 25% target: The BSA becoming legally binding legitimising a move away 
from the more ambitious 25% target. Another EU policy change which also had an 
unintended effect was the liberalisation of the power market. There was great 
flexibility in the Directive as to how countries could choose to conduct the 
liberalisation. Germany opted for a negotiated approach (Jamasb and Politt 2005: 4, 
Interview). The companies controlled much of the process themselves and mainly as a 
consequence of this the concentration on the power market increased (Interview). It 
has been mentioned that this concentration contributed to the increase in Grey 
pressure groups relative strength, and which was regarded as important in abandoning 
the 25% target.  
This brief discussion on the abandonment of the 25% target may be summed up in the 
following figure.  
 
Figure 4-2 Explaining abandonment of the 25% target: Factors and their interplay  
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4.4.3 Assessing the interplay of factors: The cap-increase 
It was assumed in this thesis that the same factors that were potentially important for 
explaining abandoning the 25% target were important for explaining the cap-increase. 
Thus, the same explanatory model was taken as point of departure. The cap-increase 
only took place during 2 months in 2004, and it was not likely that much learning and 
power balance changes took place. However, events taking place in these two months 
may have triggered changes, or prior changes may have made the events important. 
Three of the events that took place during these two months can be claimed to have 
been important for explaining the cap-increase: industry mobilisation, UK cap-
increase and rumours about the other EU countries deciding on high caps, and a 
horse-trade: renewable energies act for higher cap. However, it can be argued that the 
reason why these events got important can be found in many of the changes important 
for abandoning the 25% target.  
The first important event was the industry mobilisation. Why was this important? 
First, industry strengthened itself politically as a consequence of liberalisation and the 
increasing vulnerability of German economy. This was important in explaining the 
abandonment of the 25% target. Since the ETS directive was vague on cap 
ambitiousness, decision on ambitiousness was to a large extent up to the Member 
States. This made it possible for pressure groups to try to lobby the domestic decision 
process. The emissions trading made the costs clearer, more certain and the costs fell 
on strong groups, which mobilised.  
Decision-makers had learned that the other EU countries do not necessarily follow 
suit. Moreover, they have learned that it is politically problematic to achieve an 
ambitious climate policy. Given this, it would be even more problematic with an 
ambitious climate policy if other EU countries did not reduce their emissions very 
much: it would then be too heavy a burden on the German economy and industry. 
This can explain why the cap-signals became important, and less ambitious cap-
signals lead to more understanding in Germany for a less ambitious German cap.  
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There was, however, conflict between the ministers: and it has been argued that at the 
end this resulted in the horse-trade. Renewable energies were also important for the 
Ministry of Environment. It is plausible that learning that others do little and that an 
ambitious climate policy is problematic, lead the Environmental Minister Trittin to 
approve the cap-compromise even when it only meant a symbolic emission reduction. 
This discussion on the cap-increase is summed up in the figure below: 
 
Figure 4-3 Explaining the cap-increase: Factors, their interplay and events 
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5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to measure and explain changes in German 
climate policy strength from 2000-2005. There were many reasons why this was 
viewed as important. First, not much work has been done in regard to measuring and 
explaining changes in national climate policy strength. Second, it is important to 
study climate policy strength in Germany because this nation is a large EU-Member 
State and has been one of the climate policy leaders. Moreover, it is interesting to 
investigate the extent to which large EU-countries such as Germany are influenced by 
developments in EU policy, or if changes are mainly due to internal developments. 
Third, the period 2000-2005 is important because it starts with the first systematic 
expression of German climate policy after the EU BSA; the 2000 National Climate 
Programme. This programme was regarded as ambitious. When the next national 
climate programme commenced in 2005, the government was confronted with 
accusations of climate policy slow-down. Hence, it was interesting to see if empirical 
evidence supported the accusations of a climate policy slow-down in this period. 
Moreover, in the 1990s much relatively cheap emission reductions were made (wall 
fall profits) and it could be that the reductions have become more costly from 2000-
2005. Moreover, a new grand policy experiment was started in this period: the 
introduction of the EU emissions trading scheme.  
It was interesting to address two research questions for the reasons given above: Has 
there been a change in German climate policy strength from 2000-2005? And if so, 
what has caused this change?  
Has there been a change in German climate policy strength from 2000-2005? 
National policy strength is defined as the strength of the policy as it is framed in the 
national climate programs and the national allocation plan in the context of the EU 
ETS. This implies that this study assesses policy strength at the output level; 
moreover, that it assesses federal output. The strength of climate policy output is seen 
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as a function of ambitiousness of targets and strength of policy instruments. The 
approach for measuring climate policy strength will be discussed further below.  
I found that while climate ambitiousness has decreased, policy instrument strength has 
increased in the period. The ambitious national emission target of 25% CO2 reduction 
was abandoned for the less ambitious BSA commitment of 21% GHG emission 
reduction. In the energy and industry sector, there was a change of main instrument 
from VAs to ETS. The cap in the NAP draft was in line with the target under the 
VAs, but the cap in the final NAP was higher. The introduction of the ETS meant a 
stronger climate policy combination: ETS was binding, slightly more specific, had a 
slightly more ambitious scope and stronger compliance mechanisms.  
How could these contrasting developments in climate policy strength be interpreted? 
Studies (including this) have shown that Germany did not want ETS; it was forced on 
Germany. The reasons were that other EU countries wanted this instrument and it was 
to be decided by qualified majority. Since this mainly explains why the policy 
instrument strength increased in the period, this thesis sought to explain the more 
puzzling decrease in climate ambitiousness.  
What has caused the decrease in German climate ambitiousness? This study followed 
a complementary theory strategy. Explanatory factors were chosen which were 
believed would give a comprehensive understanding of why these changes took place. 
Is the reason simply increased abatement costs, or is there a need for a more complex 
political and institutional analysis? The discussion has shown that it is not increasing 
abatement costs per se but a German economy more vulnerable to costs (also in terms 
of job losses) is an important explanatory factor: it has contributed to a slight 
preference change – a view that ambitious climate policy is political problematic and 
that Germany cannot afford to lead  alone. It has also led to a strengthening of Grey 
societal pressure groups, by strengthening their arguments.  
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One could expect that for a large country such as Germany, internal factors and 
domestic politics would be more important, while for small EU countries EU policy 
would be more important. However, changes in power relationship between Green 
and Grey forces in government cannot explain decreasing climate ambitiousness. This 
is because both the Green Party and the Ministry of Environment have been 
strengthened in the period. However, Grey societal pressure groups have become 
stronger and this has been an important factor in explaining the decreasing climate 
ambitiousness. Why have Grey forces become stronger? The increasing vulnerability 
of economy has been pointed out while the other important factor was the EU led 
liberalisation of the power market which had an unintended effect on the German 
power market.  
Have changes in EU policy had other impacts in this period? The EU BSA became 
legally binding and, without the specific intention, legitimated the abandonment of the 
25% target. Furthermore, the ETS directive was vague on ambitiousness giving room 
for interpretation and lobbying. Moreover, the ETS instrument made the costs clearer, 
triggering a mobilisation of targeted groups.  
Hence, overall, it seems like both worsening economic conditions and other political 
factors play a role. In regard to politics, it is mainly changes in EU policy that have 
been important. The strength of this is somewhat surprising given that Germany is a 
large country and generally more prone to influence than to be influenced. Moreover, 
it seems as though EU impacts have been mostly unintended. However, both in the 
case with the cap-setting and in regard to the liberalisation of the power market, much 
freedom was given to the Member States, and in Germany to strong industry groups 
strengthening their position even further. This case on Germany shows EUs problem 
in a nut-shell: vagueness in directive and thus increased freedom to Member States 
can make it easier to get a directive approved and to get it approved quickly, although 
this freedom has consequences for the later process.  
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The purpose of this thesis has been to measure and explain changes in German 
climate policy strength. Has the theoretical approach of this study shown to be useful 
in doing this? In this study, a strong national climate policy is defined as one having 
ambitious climate targets and strong policy instruments. In order to measure policy 
instrument strength, Vedung’s degree of authoritative force was taken as the point of 
departure. This was further specified, assessing the bindningness, specificity, scope 
and compliance mechanisms of the instrument. These four criteria are taken from 
international relations theory and have been used for measuring the strength of 
international agreements. Thus, can it be argued that these criteria are less good at 
measuring national policy strength? It can, for instance, be claimed that one 
instrument may be strong in one country, but not in another. VAs were assessed as 
being less strong than ETS according to these criteria, although it may be that these 
criteria are not particularly suited for assessing instrument strength in Germany. I will 
argue that this is not so. This is because the interviewees and other sources have 
confirmed that VAs are considered weak in Germany. Moreover, these criteria also 
emerged during the interviews when the interviewees were discussing these 
instruments.  
Could another explanatory model have been used for explaining changes in national 
policy strength? In the final part of the analysis the factors are assessed jointly, 
investigating how the factors have played together in their effect on the dependent 
variable: German climate ambitiousness. Based on this assessment, and thus by 
induction, it can be argued that the model below could have been used instead.  
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Figure 5-1 Explanatory model that focuses on the interplay between factors 
This model is based on the factors used in the thesis but it focuses on their 
interrelations. It makes a distinction between factors external to the domestic policy 
process and the policy process, arguing that with one exception, the external factors 
are not important in themselves, but become important if they to lead to changes in 
power balance between Green and Grey forces or to learning and preference change. 
The exception is changes in political/legal conditions: here EU policy. This factor can 
also impact directly on changes in climate policy strength i.e. by directives. Moreover, 
in the model a distinction is made between two types of political changes: changes in 
power balance (assuming that the preferences are fixed) and preference change 
(allowing the preferences to change due to learning).  
There are challenges to this model. One challenge is to distinguish between when a 
change happens as a result of changed preferences, and when it occurs as a 
consequence of strategic choice. Another challenge is complexity. There are first- and 
second-order independent variables and much time can be used in assessing how 
these are related. Moreover, there might be a time difference between the two orders. 
The need for simplicity will have to be assessed against that of realism (and thus 
validity), and a model looking at the interrelationship of factors is more realistic than 
one viewing them separately.  
Changes in economic 
conditions: Abatement 
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Are there other important developments that could have been taken into account or 
that will be interesting to investigate in a future study? In 2006, it was argued that 
there were indications of conflicting interests between reaching the EU Lisbon 
strategy and the EU burden-sharing arrangement. The Lisbon agreement was adopted 
in 2000 and some of the main goals are to increase economic growth and decrease 
unemployment by the year 2010. This is the same year as the BSA target is intended 
to be reached. The German commissioner has argued that these targets conflict 
(Gullberg 2006). One of the interviewees stated “I do not think that it [the Kyoto 
target] will be compatible with other targets the community have” (Interview). When 
asked to specify the interviewee mentioned the Lisboan targets (ibid.). It could have 
been interesting to know when this view arose and if it is shared by many German 
stakeholders. Moreover, it would be interesting to see what will happen with BSA vs. 




Can the findings of this study contribute to shedding light on a quite dramatic event 
that took place this year? In May 2006 the EU emissions trading scheme was thrown 
into chaos when the verifier reports came in showing that most of the EU countries 
had a surplus of CO2-allowances. This led to a sudden price fall (EU Energy 2006). 
Accusations were that countries had systematically over-allocated allowances (ENDS 
Daily 2006). Germany was among the countries that had a surplus of allowances. 
BMU argued that a little less than half of the surplus was due to actual emission 
reductions, maintaining that the ETS was functioning. The rest was mainly due to 
special allocation rules in the NAP (BMU 2006a). Since Germany is one of the largest 
EU countries and very important for the EU ETS market, it is important to look into 
why one was given all of these special provisions.  
As with the cap, the ETS directive can be argued to be vague on allocation rules and 
rule combinations. The ETS directive stated that the allocation should be made 
according to objective and transparent criteria. However, it contained different types 
of rules: some rules were mentioned as mandatory and others as optional (European 
Commission 2003: Annex III). It gave much freedom to countries regarding choice 
and combination of rules as long as the mandatory rules were there. This freedom 
enabled “gaming” between and within countries. As has been pointed out, industry 
lobbied hard in the German NAP-process. Different branches lobbied for different 
special provisions and the result was many special provisions in the NAP and an 
Allocation Law providing opportunity for rule combinations, making the system 
complex and decreasing the transparency62.  How can the influence of industry be 
explained? This thesis points out that the liberalisation of the power market in 
Germany contributed to a strengthening of the power industry’s lobby position. 
                                              
62




Moreover, a slight preference change among decision-makers (that an ambitious 
policy was not realistic and that Germany should not lead alone) took place due to a 
German economy more vulnerable for costs in terms of job-losses, and this 
contributed to a strengthening of the industry’s arguments.  
Hence, it can be argued that this also illustrates the EUs problem in a nut-shell: 
vagueness’s in directives enables directives to be adopted and adopted quickly, but it 
also gives room for interpretation and “gaming” between and within countries. The 
industry’s lobby in Germany was successful given industry’s relatively strengthened 
position and a policy climate more prone to listen to industry’s arguments.  
The special rules should not lead to a cap-increase. Hence, companies which did not 
combine allocation rules received less allowances, and a quite substantial 
redistribution took place. The special provisions nevertheless led to some over-





Interviewee Position  Place/Time 
Diekmann, Jochen Energy, Transport and Environment,  
DIW Berlin 
Berlin, March 23 2006 
Erle, Franziska Liason Office (parliament/ federal 
government) VCI 
Berlin, March 21 2006 
Genz, Daniel Politics and Public Vattenfall Europe Berlin, March 20 2006 
Hein, Joachim Climate referent, BDI Berlin, March 20 2006 
Hükelheim, Katharina Division KI 1 6 Climate Change Program of 
the Federal Government, Environment and 
Energy, BMU 
Berlin, March 22 2006 
Kopp, Matthias Financial Sector & Energy, WWF Berlin, March 22 2006 
Mez, Lutz Executive Director Environmental Policy 
Research  
Centre, Free University 
Berlin, March 21 2006 
Ott, Herman E. Head Berlin Office, Wuppertal Institute for 
Climate,  
Environment and Energy 
Berlin, March 17 2006 
Seiche, Matthias Head Climate Protection, BUND Berlin, March 20 2006 
Treber, Manfred Senior Adviser Climate/Transport, 
Germanwatch 
Bonn, March 15 2006 
Werner, Klaus Representative E.ON Berlin, March 23 2006 
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